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Executive Summary 
1. Over the last decade the Department for Communities and Local Government has 
commissioned a series of studies that seek to estimate the quantity and financial 
value of planning obligations negotiated between landowners, developers and local 
planning authorities.  In 2003-4, it was estimated that planning obligations worth 
£1.9 billion had been secured.  Partially due to growth in house and land values, by 
2005-6, this had increased to an estimated £4 billion.  In 2007-8, the value of 
planning obligations was estimated at £4.9 billion.  This study, which covers 
2011/12, is an update of the previous studies.   The study estimates that the total 
value of planning obligations agreed during the year 2011/12 was £3.7bn.  
2. The scope of the 2011/12 research has broadened to evaluate the on-going role of 
planning obligations in the context of the shift to the new regime for planning 
obligations created by the introduction of the Community Infrastructure Levy.  It also 
investigates the extent to which planning obligations can affect development 
viability and stall potential development sites. As in previous years, the study 
included a survey of local planning authorities in England and achieved a response 
rate of 40%. 
3. The other main findings of the study are as follows:- 
x A reduction in the level of development activity since the previous study was 
a recurring theme.  This is illustrated by data on new housing starts in 
England which were 38% lower in 2011/12 than in 2007/08 and new orders 
for industrial and commercial development1 which were down by 51% over 
the same period.  Whilst neither housing starts nor new orders are exact 
proxies for section 106 agreements, this data does indicate the scale of the 
fall in construction activity between the last study and the current update.  
x There was a drop of approximately one third in the number of planning 
agreements per local authority compared to 2007-8. 
x In total, a nominal fall in the value of planning obligations of approximately 
23% since 2007-8 is estimated.  This is mainly due to large drops in the value 
of in-kind and land contributions.  The values of agreed affordable housing 
(£2.3bn in 2011/12) and direct payments (£1bn in 2011/12) are broadly 
comparable with 2007/08.  It is unlikely that the decline in in-kind and land 
value contributions can be attributed to deteriorating market conditions. 
x It was estimated that approximately 32,000 affordable homes were agreed 
through section 106 agreements.  This compares to over 48,000 in 2007-8; a 
33% reduction.    
x It was estimated that just over £1bn of direct payments were agreed with 
education and transport accounting for nearly 60% of the total direct 
payments; payments for education contributions were broadly unchanged 
from 2007/08, whereas contributions to transport and travel had increased.  
                                            
 
1 At 2005 prices 
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Contributions to community facilities fell, but there was a big increase in 
contributions to infrastructure/other. 
x The value of land contributions was estimated at approximately £307m.  
Over 70% of it is land for open space and affordable housing. This is a 
substantial decrease from previous studies but this seems to be due to the 
fact that a much larger proportion of land contributions in previous studies 
were made in London boroughs with high land values. 
x Onsite affordable housing provision secured through planning obligations in 
2011/12 has been concentrated in London, which accounts for 52% of all 
units agreed.  London also had the highest number of affordable housing 
units in 2007/08 (just under 30% of the total), but the difference between 
London and the rest of the country was not as pronounced as it is in 
2011/12.   
x From  across  the  country,  there  are  examples  of  schemes  that  have  ‘stalled’  
i.e. been granted planning permission and then not progressed.  Drawing on 
nationally available data, stalled developments are found to be concentrated 
in high density schemes of which a substantial majority were brownfield.  
Most stalled residential development sites were located in the lower land 
value areas.   
x At the other end of the development spectrum, large-scale Greenfield urban 
extensions can also become stalled and, although few in number, can 
represent a high proportion of planned new housing supply in some 
locations (particularly the former growth areas and growth points).    
x In-depth analysis of stalled sites supports the view that changing market 
conditions have been a major determinant of the slow-down in their progress 
but disagreements amongst consortia of landowners and difficulties in 
securing development finance are also factors contributing to delays.  
x The interaction of changes in both costs and values since 2007/08 has not 
been uniform across the country or across development types.  Viability 
analysis suggests that high value locations, such as London, have bounced 
back better from the fall in market values in 2007/08 and are more able to 
absorb recent increases in build costs. There is therefore less reason for 
sites to remain stalled in these locations. Medium and low value areas, 
where house prices are still below 2007/08 levels and build costs have 
recently started to rise again, are likely to have experienced continued 
problems with sites that have been stalled for some time. 
x Early indications are that the introduction of the Community Infrastructure 
Levy will run alongside significantly scaled back section 106 payments but 
the degree to which this is happening varies between authorities.  With the 
levy in place, the overall funding available for infrastructure may be higher as 
all dwellings contribute to the levy, whereas section 106 planning 
contributions have tended to be for larger schemes. Given the newness of 
the levy, these findings are tentative and very preliminary.  This is a topic 
that the Department for Communities and Local Government may wish to 
return in a year or so to assess the scale of the changes tentatively indicated 
in this report.  
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x In terms of the type of infrastructure that local authorities are identifying for 
Community Infrastructure Levy funding,  as  set  out  in  their  ‘Regulation  123  
list’,  education  and  transport  are  the  most common elements of early lists but 
with considerable local variation thereafter, depending on assessments of 
local need. 
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1 Introduction  
Scope of the Research 
1.1 Three previous studies have tracked the scale and main sources of planning 
obligations collected by local authorities2.  The studies have all provided estimates 
of the number and proportion of planning permissions that attract section 106 
agreements and the value of such obligations including an analysis of the type of 
obligation collected (e.g. for affordable housing, transport, open space).  The most 
recent study was published in 2010 and, as with those published in 2006 and 2008, 
relied on a research approach which combined a survey of all English local planning 
authorities, case study work with a sample of local authorities and analysis of 
planning and housing data collected by Central Government. 
1.2 This latest study has collected comparable information about the scale and 
composition of planning obligations.  This has been supplemented with additional 
collection and analysis of primary and secondary data to address a range of related 
issues about the challenges and trends in setting planning obligations and 
Community Infrastructure Levy charges. 
1.3 The objectives of the study are to: 
a) update evidence on the number and value of planning obligations for 
2011/12; 
b) gather evidence on the impact of section 106 agreements on development 
viability; 
c) explore, in particular, the value and impact of affordable housing delivered 
through section 106; 
d) consider the likely impact of the Community Infrastructure Levy on section 
106 benefits, and the relationship between the Community Infrastructure 
Levy and section 106. 
We set out below some of the key contextual matters that have shaped our 
approach to the study. 
 
 
                                            
 
2 Crook ADH, Henneberry, JM, Rowley S, & Watkins CA with the Halcrow Group (2006), Valuing Planning 
Obligations in England London Communities & Local Government. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/publica
tions/planningandbuilding/valuing-planning 
Crook ADH, Henneberry, JM, Rowley S, Smith RS, & Watkins CA (2008), Valuing Planning Obligations in 
England; Update Study for 2005-06, London Communities & Local Government. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/plan
ningandbuilding/pdf/obligationsupdatestudy.pdf 
Crook ADH, Dunning R, Ferrari ET, Henneberry, JM, Rowley S, Watkins CA, Burgess G, Lyall-Grant F, 
Monk S, & Whitehead CME (2010), The Incidence, Value and Delivery of Planning Obligations in England in 
2007-08, London, Communities & Local Government. 
http://www.cchpr.landecon.cam.ac.uk/Downloads/VPO3%20final%20report.pdf 
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Research Context 
1.4 For the last four decades, under section 52 of the Town and County Planning Act 
1971, applicants and local planning authorities have been able to enter into legally 
binding planning agreements as a condition of the grant of planning permission.  
Following the enactment of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as 
amended), these agreements were replaced by similar agreements but referred to 
as planning obligations under section 106 of that Act.  These obligations can 
include: 
x on-site and off-site provision of affordable housing and/or land for affordable 
housing; 
x provision of open space, environmental improvements, ecology, nature 
conservation, allotments and countryside management; 
x provision of sports and community facilities e.g. public toilets, public art, 
employment and training inter alia; 
x temporary and permanent highway works, provision or improvement of 
footpaths and/or cycle routes, traffic and parking management, green 
transport and travel plans, public transport improvements; 
x provision of schools or improvements to schools; 
x Payments in lieu of the above. 
 
1.5 Planning agreements are contractual arrangements between local planning 
authorities and developers/landowners that are related to a planning permission.  A 
single planning agreement can include a number of planning obligations.   
1.6 In the last decade, it has become common for local planning authorities to set tariffs 
or standard charges for planning obligations. These, it is argued, introduce a degree 
of certainty into the planning obligation estimation process and remove the need for 
negotiations but, if fixed at too high a level, can cause potential development to be 
financially unviable, particularly in low value and/or high cost locations and following 
market downturns.   
1.7 The tariffs that some local authorities have introduced can be regarded as a step 
towards the Community Infrastructure Levy introduced by the Planning Act 2008.  
The Community Infrastructure Levy came into force on the 6 April 2010 and is a 
new local levy that local authorities can choose to introduce to help fund 
infrastructure in their area.  The levy is a standard charge that provides funding for 
strategic infrastructure to run alongside scaled back section 106 obligations which 
are intended to relate only to site-related mitigation and affordable housing.   
Community infrastructure levy rates  should  not  “put  at  risk  the  delivery  of  the  
relevant Plan3”.  Charging authorities, “must  aim  to  strike  what  appears  to  the  
charging authority to be an appropriate balance between the desirability of funding 
                                            
 
3  Department for Communities and Local Government, Community Infrastructure Levy Guidance, December 2012 
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infrastructure from the levy and ‘the  potential  effects’  (taken  as  a  whole)  of  the  
imposition of community infrastructure levy on the economic viability of 
development across its area”  (Regulation  14).   
1.8 An additional matter concerns the way in which the Community Infrastructure Levy 
operates in relation to remaining section 106 requirements (and other calls on 
development such as through section 278) to deal with measures for site-specific 
mitigation.  Pursuant to Regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy 
Regulations 2010, there is now a statutory test for planning obligations. This 
requires that, for such obligations to be a material consideration in making a 
planning decision, they must be: 
a) necessary to make the development acceptable; 
b) directly related to the development; 
c) fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development. 
1.9 An important change in the regime regarding planning obligations in the last decade 
has been the use of development viability modelling to provide an evidence base for 
both site-specific negotiations between local planning authorities and developers, 
and the formation of policies regarding land allocations, planning obligations and, 
increasingly, levels of Community Infrastructure Levy.  The National Planning Policy 
Framework (2012) reinforced the importance of viability in plan making and stated 
that  planning  authorities  should  pay  “careful  attention  to  viability”.  Echoing  standard  
definitions of the market value of real estate assets, it states that: 
 
“[T]o  ensure  viability,  the  costs  of  any  requirements….such  as  requirements  for  
affordable housing, standards, infrastructure provision and other requirements 
should…  provide  competitive  returns  to  a  willing landowner and a willing developer 
to  enable  development  to  be  deliverable”  (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2012, 41). 
 
Clearly, development viability modelling is likely to remain central to the setting 
levels of the Community Infrastructure Levy and other planning obligations. 
 
1.10 Previous studies on the incidence, value and delivery of planning obligations were 
undertaken in an environment of significant economic growth which saw the 
increasing use of planning obligations.  An important aspect of this research is 
methodological continuity with these previous studies.  However, it is worth pointing 
out that previous studies reflected changes in development markets and policy, and 
the legal context in which planning obligations operated at the time of the study.  
Important contextual changes for the current study include reduced levels of public 
subsidy for affordable housing, new forms of affordable housing tenure, the impact 
on development costs of changes in costs with the change to Part L of the Building 
Regulations in 2010 and the new direction for planning signalled by the National 
Planning Policy Framework and the Localism Act. 
 
1.11 The most recent study of planning obligations relates to 2007-2008.  Since then, 
there has been a significant downturn in housing sales values, a consequent 
reduction in land values and a slow-down in house-building.  As house prices fall, 
viability is weakened and the scale of obligations that may have been acceptable in 
the past could make a scheme unviable in current market conditions. The 
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Department of Communities and Local Government has recognised the impact of 
changed market conditions on development viability and encourages local 
authorities to be proactive in renegotiating section 106 agreements where viability 
concerns are perceived to be holding back development. The Growth and 
Infrastructure Act (25 April 2013) inserts a new section 106BA, BB and BC into the 
1990 Town and Country Planning Act which introduces new procedures (including a 
right of appeal to the Secretary of State) for the review of planning obligations 
relating to the provision of affordable housing.   
 
1.12 Previous research found that affordable housing accounted for approximately half of 
the value of all planning obligations. The wide range of viability appraisals 
undertaken by this research team (at both site-specific and local authority level), 
indicate that the introduction of affordable housing will tend to have a bigger impact 
on viability than the other planning obligations sought by a local authority.  Since the 
last study there have been two important changes to the affordable housing 
‘regime’.    The  first  has  been  the  reduction  in  grants  available  for  mixed  tenure  or  
section 106 schemes (although in many parts of the country this has been the case 
for a number of years).  The second has been the introduction of Affordable Rent. 
Affordable Rent can be set at up to 80% of average market rents (net of service 
charges) and provides a greater level of scheme revenue than equivalent dwellings 
let at social rent levels. 
 
1.13 Since 2008, a body of work has been produced analysing how the planning system 
and planning obligations have been operating following the recession of 2008.  The 
Homes and Communities Agency (2009) recognised that the continued downturn in 
the housing and commercial property markets had significantly reduced the scope 
for achieving viable developer contributions for affordable housing via planning 
permissions. A key issue has been that a number of developments with planning 
conditions or obligations agreed before the market downturn are no longer viable 
and are currently undeliverable in their consented form.   
 
1.14 In research for the Department for Communities and Local Government, Ball (2010, 
71)  identified  “a  general  feeling  that  the overall costs of regulation were too high 
and  growing”.    It  was  argued  that  higher  costs  brought  on  by  regulation  make  fewer  
sites viable and that simplification of regulatory requirements would reduce 
uncertainty, time and costs; all of which improve site viability.  Builders reported 
reluctance on the part of some local authorities to renegotiate section 106 
agreements in light of changed market circumstances.  It was suggested that areas 
resistant to new development have a particular incentive to keep section 106 
requirements high and that there is a danger that high levels of section 106 on land 
with current planning permission may sterilise residential development land.  It was 
also pointed out that local authorities still expected section 106 payments upfront – 
often a long time before developers receive revenue from the site which was 
especially  burdensome  given  house  builders’  new  financial  constraints.     
 
An Overview of Research Methods 
 
1.15 Given the range of objectives outlined above, it is perhaps to be expected that a 
multi-method approach is used to address the various strands of the research.  To 
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provide context to the research, we first undertook a detailed literature review which 
helped shape the research methods employed. 
 
1.16 Given that one of the objectives of the research is to provide an update to previous 
studies for the years 2003/04, 2005/06 and 2007/08, the study adopts the methods 
and assumptions that were used in previous studies. The research, therefore, 
involves primary and secondary data collection and a blend of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. 
 
1.17 Primary data collection takes the form of a survey of all local planning authorities in 
England (this figure includes National Parks and London Thames Gateway Urban 
Development Corporation in a manner that updates previous surveys but also elicits 
additional information relevant to current market conditions and policy context. The 
overall response rate was 40% - very similar to that of previous surveys. 
 
1.18 In terms of secondary data, we analysed published data sets including those 
referred to in earlier studies, i.e. the Local Authority Housing Strategy4 for data on 
affordable housing and planning statistics for data on planning applications and 
decisions, Valuation Office Agency data on land prices and Land Registry data on 
house prices at local level.   
 
1.19 In order to gather evidence on the impact of section 106 agreements on 
development viability across a range of different development types and sizes, 
section 106 agreements’  impact  on  developer  or  landowner  returns  and  the  impact  
of  affordable  housing  ‘asks’  on  development,  the  approach  comprises  desk-based 
analysis of development viability alongside a sample of case study schemes.  For 
the analysis of viability we used a model that conceptualises the relationships 
between the main input variables in the development process to show the impacts 
of different market conditions.   
 
1.20 The investigation of the causes of stalled sites and the trends in the adoption of the 
Community Infrastructure Levy uses case studies to understand how decisions are 
made about taking development forward.  Case study research is particularly useful 
for providing an understanding of a complex issue or problem as it tends to put 
emphasis on detailed contextual analysis.  It is particularly useful as an exploratory 
tool where there is limited previous research on topics.   
 
1.21 For in-depth interviews, the literature suggests that saturation is commonly 
achieved after approximately 6-12 interviews (see Gubrium and Holstein, 2001; 
Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006).  The interviews are expected to provide 
grounded  insights  into  the  fundamental  causes  of  ‘stalled’  sites.    Acknowledging  
that controlling most of the interview agenda will involve a potential compromise 
between the ability to generalise and discovery, the purpose of the interviews is to 
explore the relative contribution of planning obligations relative to other factors in 
stalling sites and to explore other factors inhibiting the development of sites. 
 
                                            
 
4 In previous years this was called the Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix (Housing Strategy Statistical 
Appendix). 
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1.22 A different set of case studies are used to provide a provisional insight into the way 
the introduction of the Community Infrastructure Levy is interacting with the use of 
planning obligations and how far section 106 agreements are being scaled back.  
For this analysis, we have also reviewed a number of viability studies supporting the 
charging schedules proposed by local authorities (sourced from the web) to give an 
overview of the scale of planning obligations anticipated when an authority has the 
levy in place. 
 
1.23 The study has also employed the use of expert workshops to explore qualitative 
issues with leading practitioners.   
 
Structure of the Report 
1.24 The report is divided into two main parts.  Part A described the results from the local 
planning authority survey, including extrapolations of the value of planning 
obligations.  The second part (Part B) discusses issues around scheme viability and 
the reasons for schemes becoming stalled.  Part B also includes a review of the 
early implications of the implementation of the Community Infrastructure Levy. 
1.25 The study conclusions are drawn together in the final Chapter of the report. 
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Part A: Survey of local planning 
authorities 
2. Planning Agreements: Numbers, Policies 
and Practices 
Introduction 
2.1 This chapter reports on the results of the local planning authority survey which relate 
to the policies and practices around the use of section 106 agreements, the 
Community Infrastructure Levy and infrastructure provision.  The survey 
questionnaire was used to investigate whether there had been significant changes to 
the policies and practices of local planning authorities in the light of the downturn in 
economic and property market activity and the introduction of new policies such as 
the Community Infrastructure Levy.   
2.2 The remainder of the chapter provides data on the numbers of planning agreements, 
the scale of policies on affordable housing, local authority policies regarding re-
negotiation of section 106 agreements and progress on the implementation of the 
Community Infrastructure Levy.  The latter issues are linked to more in-depth 
analyses presented later in the report on stalled sites and the effects of  the levy on 
development viability 
Key Findings 
x In total, respondents reported 2,516 planning agreements.  Over three quarters 
of planning agreements related to residential schemes. Planning authorities 
responding to the survey in 2011-12 entered into just under 20 agreements per 
authority.  This represents a drop of approximately one third compared to the 
2007-8 study which reported 30 agreements per authority.  
 
x Approximately half of schemes with planning agreements signed in the period 
2008-2011 have started. 
 
x 87% of local authorities have an affordable housing policy. 
 
x 45 (36%) local authorities had renegotiated section 106 planning agreements 
during the 2011/12 financial year.  Nearly all requests to renegotiate section 106 
agreements in 2011/12 led to a change in the planning agreement. 
 
x When the survey was conducted, four (3%) local authorities had an adopted 
Community Infrastructure Levy policy, 70 (56%) were in the process of preparing 
a levy policy but had yet to publish a preliminary draft, 16 (13%) had a draft 
schedule and 28 (23%) were not preparing a schedule (as at 31 March 2012). 
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Planning agreements 
Staffing 
 
2.3 Respondents were asked whether they had officers who negotiated and monitored 
planning agreements.  Indicating no significant change from the 2007-8 study, the 
survey results suggest that 24% of local authorities employ a dedicated officer to 
negotiate planning agreements.  In over half (54%) of cases, this is undertaken by 
case officers and in many others it is a combination of case officers and other, 
usually more senior, staff from planning, legal, economic development/regeneration 
and finance sections.  In one case the legal team negotiates and monitoring is 
undertaken by a Senior Planning Officer and in three cases there were dedicated 
Planning Obligations/Contributions Officers to provide advice to the case officers. 
 
2.4 Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of the results from the latest survey by local 
authority family5 and compares them to the previous two surveys.  Local authorities 
in Urban England, Commuter Belt6  and Existing Urban Centres have shed 
dedicated negotiating staff since 2007/08 whereas as London has increased its 
number considerably.  Rural Towns have also increased their number of dedicated 
negotiating staff but to a much lesser extent.  Apart from London, there has also 
been a significant reduction in dedicated monitoring staff, largely back to the levels 
seen in 2005/06. 
 
Table 2.1: Use of an officer(s) dedicated to (a) negotiating and (b) monitoring 
planning agreements 
 
Local authority 
family 
(a) Negotiating (b) Monitoring 
2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 
Rural England 20% 26% 26% 50% 76% 56% 
Rural Towns 16% 22% 27% 79% 65% 59% 
Urban England 29% 24% 12% 71% 81% 71% 
Commuter Belt 5% 18% 12% 65% 68% 50% 
Existing Urban 
Centres 
8% 10% 5% 50% 70% 57% 
London 18% 31% 75% 82% 100% 100% 
 
                                            
 
65   Local  authority  ‘families’  were  defined  in  the  2006  edition  of  this  study  (op  cit)  and  these  definitions  were, 
in turn, an amended version of a local authority typology developed by Vickers et al (2003). The numbers of 
local authorities in each family are as follows (a full listing is included as an appendix to the 2006 report): 
Established Urban Centres  30 
Urban England    46 
Rural Towns    119 
Rural England    57 
Commuter Belt    76 
Urban London     26. 
6 This  replaces  the  term  ‘Prosperous  Britain’  that  was  found  in  previous  surveys.    It  was  felt  that  ‘’Commuter  
Belt’  was  a  better  descriptor. 
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2.5 Monitoring of planning agreements is undertaken by dedicated staff in the majority 
(61%) of local authorities and these may be dedicated section 106 or Planning 
Enforcement Officers, staff from the legal section or other teams such as Economic 
Development, Business Improvement or Sustainable Development. This is lower 
than the levels observed in 2005-6 (64%) and 2007-8 (75%).  It may reflect local 
authority expenditure cutbacks and/or a lower workload.    Rarely (in 9% of cases) 
is the same person responsible for both negotiation and enforcement. 
 
Number and content of planning agreements 
2.6 Table 2.2 shows the average number of planning agreements per local authority 
classified by local authority family.  London authorities have the highest average 
followed, some way behind, by Commuter Belt.  Existing Urban Centres and Rural 
England have the lowest average.  For comparison over time the results from the 
previous three surveys are also included in the table.  Apart from London, which 
has the highest average in all but the first survey, there does not appear to be a 
discernible pattern.  Rural England fluctuated considerably; Existing Urban Centres 
had high averages in the two middle surveys as did Urban England, perhaps due to 
a surge in apartment building during that time. A breakdown of the results by local 
authority family is shown in Figure 2.1 with supporting data in Table 2.2 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Average number of planning agreements per local 
authority classified by local authority family 
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Table 2.2: Average number of planning agreements per local authority 
classified by local authority family 
 
Local authority 
family 
No. 
authorities 
2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 
Rural England 39 26.9 13.8 36.2 15.4 
Rural Towns 22 15.1 17.1 12.9 18.3 
Urban England 17 19.3 35.1 29.5 21.4 
Commuter Belt 26 33.9 28.3 27.6 25.6 
Existing Urban 
Centres 
14 13.8 25.5 25.0 14.7 
London 8 25.9 41.0 47.5 34.6 
ENGLAND 126    20.0 
 
2.7 Table 2.3 also shows the average number of planning agreements per local 
authority but this time classified by type of application.  The decline in agreements 
for residential developments in the most recent survey can be seen, particularly in 
the case of major schemes.  Overall, the average number of planning agreements 
is at its lowest level since the surveys began in 2003/04. 
 
Table 2.3: Average number of planning agreements per local authority 
classified by type of planning application 
 
Application type 2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 
Minor dwellings 10.2 8.9 12.7 9.6 
Major dwellings 8.1 11.0 9.5 5.7 
All dwellings 17.6 19.9 22.2 15.3 
Major commercial 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 
Other major 1.0 1.9 2.1 1.18 
ALL 25.0 25.7 29.8 20.0 
 
2.8 The number of planning agreements signed between 1/4/11 and 31/3/12 which 
relate to full and outline planning permissions for dwellings is shown in Figure 2.2 
below and in Table 2.4, together with the number of dwellings associated with them. 
Figure 2.2 highlights the importance of smaller schemes in terms of total number of 
agreements.  But Table 2.4 also shows that most of the dwellings included in the 
planning agreements are found in larger schemes (at around 72% of dwellings in 
schemes of 100 or more dwellings). 
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Figure 2.2: Planning agreements signed between 1/4/11 and 31/3/12 (full and 
outline planning permissions) by size of development (numbers of dwellings) 
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Table 2.4: Planning agreements signed between 1/4/11 and 31/3/12 which 
relate to full and outline planning permissions for dwellings 
 
Size of development 
(by number of 
dwellings) 
Number of 
agreements 
Number of 
dwellings in 
agreements 
0-9 1,204 3,080 
10-19 263 3,258 
20-49 202 5,919 
50-99 124 8,431 
100-999 114 27,762 
1000+ 11 24,418 
TOTAL 1,924 72,868 
 
2.9 For land uses other than residential most planning agreements related to major 
schemes and, in terms of floorspace, were fairly evenly distributed between 
commercial, industrial and retail.  Table 2.5 shows that the amount of floorspace per 
agreement was much higher for industrial and storage uses than for office and retail 
schemes.  In five cases, planning agreements related to developments where the 
floor space was not given; these were a holiday unit on a pier, three hotels and a 
nursing home.  Only in one local authority were no planning agreements signed in 
the 2011/12 financial year. 
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Table 2.5: Planning agreements signed between 1/4/11 and 31/3/12 which 
relate to full and outline planning permissions for other land uses 
 Number of 
agreements 
Total 
floorspace 
(sqm) 
Offices/ Research & Development/ Light Industrial 
Major 74 1,268,985 
Minor 33 53,593 
General Ind./Storage/Warehousing 
Major 39 1,349,747 
Minor 14 7,448 
Retail/Distribution and Servicing 
Major 109 1,089,575 
Minor 58 15,421 
Other 
Major 149 909,185 
Minor 116 210,896 
TOTAL 592 4,904,850 
 
2.10 In total, respondents reported 2,516 planning agreements.  Over three quarters of 
planning agreements related to residential schemes. Small residential schemes 
(fewer than 20 dwellings) accounted for nearly 60% of all planning agreements and 
schemes with fewer than 10 dwellings accounting for almost half of all agreements.  
Planning authorities responding to the survey in 2011-12 entered into just under 20 
agreements per authority.  This represents a drop of approximately one third 
compared to the 2007-8 study.  It also represents a drop from the 25 planning 
agreements per local authority reported in the 2003-4 and 2005-6 studies.  Table 
2.6 shows the breakdown by local authority family. 
 
2.11 Although there has been a substantial drop in the number of planning agreements 
per local authority, there has been little change in the number of planning 
agreements per local authority relating to small residential schemes.   In 2007-8, 
there  were  12.7  agreements  per  authority  (based  on  category  ‘minor  dwellings’,  i.e.  
less than 10 units).  In 2011-2012, the figure for residential developments under 20 
dwellings was 11.6.  Given the substantial drop in planning agreements per local 
authority overall, this is consistent with a significant increase in the proportion of 
small schemes being the subject of planning agreements. 
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Table 2.6: Planning agreements signed between 1/4/11 and 31/3/12 which relate to full and outline planning permissions 
for other land uses, classified by local authority family 
 
 Units Rural 
England 
Rural 
Towns 
Urban 
England 
Commuter 
Belt 
Existing 
Urban 
Centres 
London England 
DWELLINGS 
Number of 
Agreements 
0-9 301 189 124 416 67 107 1,204 
10-19 72 40 40 69 30 12 263 
20-49 60 28 37 33 22 22 202 
50-99 36 19 26 16 11 16 124 
100-999 14 20 19 18 15 28 114 
1000+ 3 1 1 7 0 5 17 
TOTAL 486 297 247 559 145 190 1,924 
Number of 
Dwellings in 
Agreements 
0-9 798 457 346 864 262 353 3,080 
10-19 938 506 528 721 402 163 3,258 
20-49 1,727 845 1,121 784 718 724 5,919 
50-99 2,397 1,349 2,174 589 784 1,138 8,431 
100-999 2,882 4,611 4,259 3,354 2,772 9,884 27,762 
1000+ 5,533 3,150 1,245 3,300 0 11,190 24,418 
TOTAL 14,275 10,918 9,673 9,612 4,938 23,452 72,868 
Offices, research & 
development, light 
industrial 
Number of 
Agreements 
Major 6 8 15 10 5 30 74 
Minor 
9 4 4 9 2 5 
33 
General industrial, 
storage, 
warehousing 
Number of 
Agreements 
Major 10 14 6 4 5 0 39 
Minor 
2 2 4 6 0 0 
14 
Retail, distribution, 
servicing 
Number of 
Agreements 
Major 20 17 28 15 23 6 109 
Minor 5 11 16 14 2 10 58 
Other Number of 
Agreements 
Major 28 34 26 27 17 17 149 
Minor 35 15 18 22 7 19 116 
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Conversion of agreements to completions 
 
2.12 Table 2.7 shows the numbers of planning agreements, proportions of planning 
agreements that have started and completed over the past three years broken 
down by local authority family.  Apart from rural areas, the number of signed 
planning agreements has increased in 2011/12 compared to previous years, in 
London and Commuter Belt quite substantially. 
 
2.13 Approximately half of schemes with planning agreements signed in the period 2008-
2011 have started.  Whilst there are some variations between local authority 
families, there are also sometimes substantial differences over time and it is not 
possible to identify a clear pattern.  Similarly for schemes completed, the data seem 
inconclusive in this respect.  The only noticeable, albeit expected, pattern is that a 
lower proportion of schemes with planning agreements made in 2010-11 have 
started when compared to schemes with planning agreements made in 2008-9.  
Only in Commuter Belt and in Existing Urban Centres was this not the case. 
 
2.14 In terms of numbers of affordable housing units delivered a quarter of completions 
were in Commuter Belt in 2011/12, an increase over previous years.  In London the 
proportion has declined from 27% to 17%. 
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Table 2.7: Proportion of planning agreements completed since 2008/9 
 
 
 
Number of 
agreements 
signed 
% 
started 
% 
completed 
Affordable 
housing 
completions 
% of 
England 
total 
ENGLAND 
2008/09 2,078 51% 45% 6,852 - 
2009/10 2,029 53% 36% 7,508 - 
2010/11 2,327 48% 28% 7,584 - 
Rural England 
2008/09 781 48% 42% 1,414 21% 
2009/10 758 46% 37% 1,306 17% 
2010/11 749 43% 23% 1,497 20% 
Rural Towns 
2008/09 187 43% 34% 1,023 15% 
2009/10 272 47% 50% 1,245 17% 
2010/11 266 43% 25% 956 13% 
Urban England 
2008/09 250 53% 51% 739 11% 
2009/10 278 63% 48% 992 13% 
2010/11 343 55% 34% 1,164 15% 
Commuter Belt 
2008/09 479 58% 63% 1,432 21% 
2009/10 395 49% 50% 1,451 19% 
2010/11 543 52% 50% 1,902 25% 
Existing Urban Centres 
2008/09 131 43% 41% 776 11% 
2009/10 119 48% 28% 518 7% 
2010/11 152 44% 29% 805 11% 
London 
2008/09 250 67% 52% 1,468 21% 
2009/10 207 61% 47% 1,996 27% 
2010/11 274 62% 33% 1,260 17% 
 
 
2.15 Turning to the content of planning agreements, Table 2.8 shows the average 
number of planning obligations per agreement classified by local authority family.  
All families follow the national trend; an increased number of obligations reported in 
the 2005/06 and 2007/08 surveys followed by a decline in the latest survey.  Local 
authorities in London secured, on average, nearly twice as many obligations as the 
national average. 
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Table 2.8: Average number of planning obligations per agreement 
Classified by local authority family 
 
Local authority 
family 
2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 
Rural England 1.00 1.59 3.22 1.62 
Rural Towns 1.68 2.28 4.51 2.08 
Urban England 1.96 2.50 2.84 1.38 
Commuter Belt 1.57 2.80 3.24 2.16 
Existing Urban 
Centres 
1.38 1.99 2.52 1.65 
London 1.84 2.26 1.62 3.99 
ENGLAND 1.45 2.44 2.96 2.06 
 
 
2.16 Following a now familiar trend, Table 2.9 shows that the average number of direct 
payment obligations per authority has declined in the 2011/12 survey following a 
peak in the 2005/06 and 2007/08 surveys, but the decline is not substantial.  
Interestingly affordable housing obligations have remained constant over the 
sequence of surveys and community and leisure obligations have increased.  It is 
the transport and travel and, to a lesser extent, the open space obligations that 
have declined. 
 
Table 2.9: Average number of direct payment obligations per authority 
classified by type of obligation 
 
Obligation type 2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 
Affordable housing 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Open space 11.1 12.5 14.1 13.4 
Transport and travel 7.3 12.0 12.2 9.0 
Community and 
leisure 
3.0 6.1 6.0 9.2 
Education 2.5 5.2 4.6 4.1 
Other 0.4 9.4 15.3 1.3 
All 25.0 46.0 53.1 37.8 
 
 
2.17 In-kind obligations, contrastingly, have declined significantly in the 2011/12 survey 
compared to all previous surveys.  Table 2.10 shows that Affordable housing in-kind 
obligations were less than half their average in 2007/08 and the declines in other 
obligations are far greater than that.  In total this has led to a reduction in average 
in-kind obligations per authority of two thirds from the 2007/08 survey. 
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Table 2.10: Average number of in-kind obligations per authority  
classified by type of obligation 
 
Obligation type 2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2011/12 
Affordable housing 3.1 5.6 7.6 3.4 
Open space 2.2 1.8 2.5 0.7 
Transport and travel 4.1 4.2 5.1 2.1 
Community and 
leisure 
0.9 0.8 1.4 1.0 
Education 0.1 0.1 0 0.0 
Other 2.3 2.6 4.9 0.0 
All 12.8 15.0 21.6 7.4 
 
 
Use of standard section 106 agreements 
2.18 Respondents were asked whether they used standard heads of terms or model 
agreements for section 106 negotiations. The responses were fairly evenly split; 
56% do use them, 44% do not.  One local authority stated that it does not publish its 
own standard terms but refers to the Law Society Heads of Terms instead.  For 
those local authorities that do publish their own, the standard terms are generally 
published on the web.  The 2007-8 study asked local authorities whether they used 
standard heads of terms or model agreements for planning agreements.  It found 
that 16% of local authorities used these in all cases, 24% used them in some cases 
and 42% used them as a starting point. 
 
Planning obligations 
Approaches 
 
1.24 The  vast  majority  (79%)  of  local  authorities  have  a  ‘policy’  on  the  use  of  planning  
obligations either as a specific policy within their local development plan and/or as 
supplementary guidance. Most policies have been introduced since 2007. For those 
authorities with a policy, their status is shown in Table 2.11 and frequency of update 
in Table 2.12.  The results suggest little change from the 2007/08 study which found 
that only 7% of local planning authorities had no formally adopted policy on 
planning obligations 
 
Table 2.11: Status of Policy 
 % 
Development plan policy (but no Supplementary Planning 
Document) 
29% 
Supplementary Planning Document specifically for 
planning obligations (may also have a development plan 
policy) 
51% 
Supplementary Planning Documents for individual topics 
e.g. open space, affordable housing 
12% 
Other guidance (maybe formally adopted by local authority 
e.g. guide for developers) 
8% 
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Table 2.12: Frequency of Update 
 
 % 
Annually or bi-
annually 
14% 
Every 2-5 Years 36% 
Every 5 years or 
more 
30% 
Not Stated 20% 
 
1.25 The survey results suggest that updating takes place fairly infrequently with 66% of 
respondents updating their approach every two years or more.  It is not possible to 
assess the extent to which policy obsolescence is likely to be an issue given the 
lack of detailed information on whether policies set relative or absolute 
requirements in terms of planning obligations.   
 
Standard charges 
 
1.26 A number of authorities make use of standard charges or formulae to guide the 
calculation of planning obligations. Table 2.13 shows the percentage of authorities 
with planning obligation policies (whatever their status) which use standard charges 
or formulae for different types of planning obligation.  The table shows that standard 
charges are most likely for open space/environment and least likely for transport 
and travel. 
 
Table 2.13: Proportion of policies that include standard charging  
or formulae for specific planning obligations 
 
Type of planning obligation % using standard 
charges or 
formulae 
Affordable housing 62% 
Open Space and the environment 79% 
Community and leisure 46% 
Transport and travel 43% 
Education 53% 
 
2.22 There is a range of other items for which some authorities operate standard 
charges or formulae.  Examples of these include: 
a) public realm 
b) libraries 
c) employment and training 
d) art 
e) waste and recycling 
f) health and social care 
g) town centre management 
h) drainage, flood prevention 
i) monitoring (construction) 
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Affordable Housing Policies 
 
2.23 87% of local authorities have a policy for the provision of affordable housing but 
Table 2.14 shows that Rural Towns and Existing Urban Centres are less likely than 
other  local  authority  ‘families’  to  have  such  a  policy.    64%  of  affordable  housing  
policies are published in core strategies, local or other adopted plans and 32% in 
supplementary planning documents or guidance. 
 
Table 2.14: Local authorities with policies on affordable housing 
 
Local authority family Yes No 
Rural England 36 3 
Rural Towns 17 5 
Urban England 16 1 
Commuter Belt 24 2 
Existing Urban Centres 11 3 
London 7 1 
ENGLAND 111 15 
 
2.24 107 (86%) local authorities specify a threshold number of dwellings above which 
planning obligations in respect of affordable housing are required.  91 of these 107 
authorities provided details of the thresholds and these are shown in Figure 2.3 and 
Table 2.15 below.  The table includes area based thresholds but the chart only 
includes thresholds expressed in terms of number of dwellings. 
 
Figure 2.3: Thresholds for affordable housing requirement  
– by number of dwellings and location 
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Table 2.15: Thresholds for affordable housing requirement 
 Threshold 
(no. 
dwellings) 
TOTAL 
Urban 1 to 5 12 
6 to 10 17 
11 to 14 2 
15 37 
16 to 25 2 
Rural 1 to 4 3 
5+ 6 
   
By area 
(rural and 
urban 
combined) 
0.1 to 0.4 ha 2 
0.5 ha 9 
0.6 to 0.9 ha 0 
1+ ha 1 
 
2.25 The 12 authorities in the survey that expressed the affordable housing threshold in 
terms of site area combined this with a threshold that related to a number of 
dwellings.  In no case did a local authority set a threshold purely in terms of area. 
 
2.26 For developments where the total number of dwellings exceeded the threshold, the 
proportion of affordable housing sought ranged from 15% to 50%. 
 
2.27 Just over half (57%) of the sample of local authorities have a uniform affordable 
housing policy that is used across the whole of their area.  38 authorities (30%)76  
have a target for affordable housing provision that varies according to certain 
criteria.  The types of criteria identified are listed below: 
a) Number of dwellings in a scheme 
b) Population of settlement 
c) Brownfield/greenfield sites 
d) Different parts of the council area including: 
o On the basis of Housing Market Areas / parishes 
o Between rural/urban and sustainable urban extension sites 
o Location generally (normally distinguishing between main urban areas 
and elsewhere) 
 
Renegotiation of section 106 Agreements 
2.28 In order to assess the extent to which local authorities were being flexible on 
section 106 agreements in response to the downturn, respondents were asked 
about the numbers of section 106 agreements being renegotiated.  45 (36%) of 
local authorities had renegotiated section 106 planning agreements during the 
2011-12 financial year.  The breakdown by local authority family is shown in Table 
2.16. 
                                            
 
7 The remaining 13% did not state whether their policy varied or not 
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Table 2.16: Number of local authorities renegotiating one or more  
planning agreements during 2011/12 
 
Local authority 
family 
No. % 
Rural England 18 40% 
Rural Towns 6 13% 
Urban England 5 11% 
Commuter Belt 8 18% 
Existing Urban 
Centres 
5 11% 
London 3 7% 
ENGLAND 45 36% 
 
2.29 The respondents were asked to provide brief details of three renegotiations that had 
taken place during the 2011/12 financial year.  There was a wide range of 
responses and the main examples are summarised below, grouping similar 
responses where possible: 
 
a) Reduced level of overall contribution; 
b) Reductions in the amount of affordable housing provision and in the amount 
of commuted sum payments in lieu of affordable housing.  In one case the 
affordable housing requirement was removed altogether; 
c) Introduction of staged payments (or postponement of staged payments that 
had already been agreed); 
d) Introduction of a claw-back mechanism (i.e. reduce planning obligations 
subject to an increase provision should viability improve within a specified 
time period); 
e) Change of affordable housing tenure (e.g. from social rented to affordable 
rent); 
f) Switch from affordable housing provision to commuted payment; 
g) Extension of time limit for implementation of permission; 
h) Change of clause relating to status of purchasers of affordable housing. 
 
2.30 Nearly all requests to renegotiate section 106 agreements in 2011/12 led to a 
change in the planning agreement.  Only 6% of respondents (seven local 
authorities) stated that requests did not lead to a change.  The number of sites 
involved was also seven, and four of these were in London.  From the comments 
provided in the questionnaire responses, renegotiations appeared to be on-going 
with regard to either changing the affordable housing mix to introduce Affordable 
Rent or change the timing of the provision of affordable housing.  The reasons 
given were as follows: 
 
a) Housing site nearing completion but at considerable loss.  Variation of 
section 106 agreement sought to remove contribution to education and 
public open space.  Request refused by the planning committee as they 
considered that the developer knew it would be a difficult site to develop and 
that money was needed for the community;    
b) The developer sought to reduce the amount of affordable housing.  Viability 
was examined and a change to the tenure mix was agreed instead; 
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c) The developer requested a change in affordable tenure. Given the  site’s  
location in the Development Plan Amendment, the request was refused; 
d) The developer could not provide sufficient viability grounds to renegotiate 
section 106; 
e) A request to remove the obligation to provide on-site affordable housing was 
refused. 
 
2.31 Local authorities were also asked, as at 1 April 2012, how many section 106 
agreements were in the process of being renegotiated.  A breakdown of the results 
by local authority family is shown in Figure 2.4 with supporting data in Table 2.17.  
Over two thirds of renegotiations were taking place in rural areas.  There were 
relatively low numbers of renegotiations taking place in London. 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Number of section 106 planning agreements that were in the process  
of being renegotiated on 1 April 2012 
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Table 2.17: Number of section 106 planning agreements that were in the process  
of being renegotiated on 1 April 2012 
 
Local authority family Total 
Rural England 70 
Rural Towns 38 
Urban England 10 
Commuter Belt 20 
Existing Urban Centres 18 
London 8 
ENGLAND 164 
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2.32 Respondents were also asked a number of questions about re-negotiations.  This is 
shown in Figure 2.5 with supporting data in Table 2.18.  It shows that approximately 
half (61 authorities8 or 48%) of the 126 responding local authorities had agreed to a 
reduced level of contribution towards affordable housing on the grounds of viability 
during the 2011/12 financial year.  The majority of these had been agreed in Rural 
England.  Local authorities commented that these reductions were agreed on a 
case-by-case basis and based on viability plus size and tenure of properties being 
offered. 
 
Figure 2.5:  Local authorities that had agreed to a reduced level of  
affordable housing on viability grounds in 2011/12 
 
Local authority 
family 
Number of 
responding 
local 
authorities 
% of 
responding 
local 
authorities 
No. of 
reduced 
contributions 
Rural England 21 34% 129 
Rural Towns 9 15% 15 
Urban England 8 13% 6 
Commuter Belt 10 16% 20 
Existing Urban 
Centres 
8 13% 28 
London 5 6% 34 
ENGLAND 61  232 
 
2.33 The  final  question  in  the  survey  asked  about  stalled  sites  which  are  ‘shovel  ready’,  
in other words where planning permission has been granted and planning 
obligations agreed. In an open-ended form, respondents were asked to suggest 
reasons why, in relevant cases, development had not yet started.  The responses 
can be summarised under five headings:   
• Economic cycle 
o Planning permissions granted for high density schemes often on 
brownfield sites in the boom years 
o The developer does not wish to bring the site forward until the 
economy improves 
• Lack of access to finance 
o Mortgages 
o Development finance 
• Lack of demand 
o For commercial space 
• Planning 
o Submission of revised planning application 
o section 106 renegotiations 
• Site issues 
                                            
 
8   This figure is more than the total number of authorities that said that they had renegotiated a planning 
agreement in 2011-12 – see para 2.28.  It appears that survey respondents may have been interpreting the 
questions differently and may have included schemes yet to secure a section 106 agreement in answer to 
the question about reduced levels of affordable housing. 
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o Changes in ownership 
o Unforeseen abnormal costs and constraints 
o Legal issues between the landowners, developer, registered 
providers, etc.  
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3. The Incidence and Value of Planning 
Obligations 
Introduction 
 
3.1 The local planning authority survey asked authorities to provide information relating 
to the number and value of planning obligations that they had agreed with 
landowners and developers during the 2011-12 financial year.  
 
3.2 In order to identify changes over time, the 2011/12 survey repeated a number of the 
questions asked in previous studies.   
 
Key Findings 
 
• The total value of planning obligations agreed in the year 2011/12 is 
estimated at £3.7 billion. 
• Three data sources were used to estimate the numbers of affordable 
dwellings agreed in planning agreements.  All produced estimates between 
31,000 and 33,000.  The total value of the dwellings was estimated at 
£2.3billion. 
• It is estimated that just over £1 billon of direct payments were agreed.  
Education and transport accounted for nearly 60% of the total direct 
payments.  Compared to estimated average direct payments per obligation 
of circa £250,000 in £2003/04, £370,000 in 2005/06 and £592,000 in 
2007/08, the average direct payment for affordable housing in 2011/12 is 
estimated at close to £470,000. 
• For in-kind contributions, using the approach taken in previous studies, it is 
estimated that total number of obligations is in the region of 1300-1500 with a 
value of £80 million.  (But this is likely to be an underestimation as the case 
also with previous studies).   
• The value of land contributions is estimated at approximately £307 million.  
Over 70% of it is land for open space and affordable housing.  This is a 
substantial decrease from previous studies.9   
• The estimated average value of planning obligations is £272,000 (including 
affordable housing, other direct payments and in-kind contributions).10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
9   See para 3.18 to 3.19 for an explanation of why the reasons for the underestimation 
10   That is 13,600 planning obligations totalling £3.7bn 
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Extrapolation Procedure 
 
3.3 As in previous studies, the estimates for the number and value of planning 
obligations contained are based on extrapolations from the sample survey results 
responses  from  the  questionnaire  survey  which  have  been  ‘grossed  up’  to  provide  
estimates for the whole population of local authorities.  The information provided 
through the survey is detailed but, if it is to be regarded as a national-level evidence 
base for policy purposes, the process of extrapolation from survey sample to whole 
population should be clear and rational.   
 
3.4 To ensure continuity with previous studies and to assist longitudinal comparison, we 
adopted  the  local  authority  ‘family’  method  for  categorising  local  authorities.    Details  
of this method can be found in Crook et al (2006).  Because this method of 
categorisation is an adapted version of an approach devised ten years ago (Vickers 
et al, 2003)11 , we devised another approach as a robustness check. This took the 
form of a local authority categorisation that was based on levels of house prices and 
housing supply in local authorities– both indicators that are closely aligned to land 
development activity and are regularly updated data series that are published by 
Government. It was reassuring that their estimates were broadly consistent. 
 
 
The Estimated Value of All Planning Obligations 
3.5 In summary, we estimate the value of all planning obligations as follows: 
 
Table 3.1: The Estimated Value of All Planning Obligations* 
 
 2011-12 2007-8 Change 
Affordable housing £2.3bn £2.6bn -11.5% 
Direct payments £1bn £1bn 0% 
In-kind £0.1bn £0.3bn -67% 
Land contributions £0.3bn £0.9bn -66% 
Total £3.7bn £4.8bn -23% 
*Rounded to nearest £0.1bn  
 
3.6 In total, we estimate a nominal fall in the value of planning obligations of 
approximately 23% since 2007-8.  This is mainly due to large drops in the value of 
in-kind and land contributions.  The values of agreed affordable housing and direct 
payments have remained fairly stable between the two periods.  It is unlikely that 
the drops in these two areas can be attributed to deteriorating market conditions.  
The land contribution figures in 2007/08 were particularly high due to the fact that 
there was a high concentration of land contributions in high value Camden. This 
was not repeated in 2011/12.    
 
                                            
 
11 Vickers, D., Rees, P. and Birkin, M. (2003) A new classification of UK local authorities using 2001 census 
key statistics. Working Paper 03-03, School of Geography, University of Leeds 
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The Estimated Number and Value of Affordable Housing 
Units 
 
3.7 We have two possible sources of data on affordable housing agreed through 
planning obligations; the local authority housing survey and the survey sample.  
Reassuringly both sources are fairly consistent in terms of the aggregate numbers.  
As we can see in Table 3.2, the survey sample, extrapolated by local authority 
family, estimates the agreed provision of 32,201 dwellings onsite.  With 303 offsite 
dwellings, this gives a total estimate of 32,504 dwellings.  The comparable figures 
for the value-activity categorisation are 31,082 onsite and 113 offsite, giving a total 
estimate of 31,195.  The local authority housing survey reports a similar number of 
agreed affordable dwellings 32,753. The different approaches then produce 
estimates of 96-101 affordable dwellings agreed per local authority in the study 
period. 
 
3.8 Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 together highlight the concentration of affordable housing 
agreed in London as well as in the local  authority  ‘family’  classified  as  ‘rural’. 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of on-site affordable housing agreed by Local Authority Family 
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Table 3.2: Number of onsite affordable dwellings agreed 
 
 Total 
sample 
Mean per 
LA 
Population 
Estimate 
Rural England 2596 67 6856 
Rural Towns 560 25 1451 
Urban England 1088 64 4544 
Commuter Belt 1456 56 2240 
Existing Urban 
Centre 
186 13 385 
London 5146 643 16725 
TOTAL 11032  32201 
Source: Extrapolated survey sample – Local Authority Family method 
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3.9 The provision of affordable housing represents a significant proportion of agreed 
planning obligations.  It is also the most significant planning obligation in terms of 
value.  There are a wide range of possible approaches to estimating the value of 
the agreed affordable dwellings and, typically, two approaches are used in 
development viability appraisals: 
 
a) Discounted Market Value 
 
This is based on the amount paid by Registered Providers to developers.  For 
example, assume that a socially rented dwelling has a value of £200,000.  
Assuming that Registered Providers pay 60% of Market Value to developers, the 
gain from the planning obligation is £80,000 (Market Value of £200,000 received 
minus £120,000 payment to developer).  The key inputs are the Market Value of the 
dwellings and the ratio of Market Value paid by Registered Providers for the 
dwellings.   
 
b) Capitalised Net Income 
 
Another common approach is to apply a capitalisation rate to the estimated rental 
income that might be charged to the occupiers of the affordable dwelling.  The key 
inputs are the capitalisation rate, the gross rent and appropriate deductions for 
voids, bad debts, maintenance and management.  This clearly requires more inputs 
and the key input – the capitalisation rate – is difficult to observe from market 
transactions.  This is essentially an income approach to valuation.   
 
3.10 The three previous studies used a range of approaches to value the affordable 
housing transferred.  However, the single common approach used in all studies was 
to value the land and add the cost the construction of affordable housing units.  In 
valuation terms, this method is essentially a (depreciated) replacement cost 
approach.   The approach relies on numerous generalised assumptions applied at 
national level.  For example, a development density of 50 dwellings per hectare was 
assumed across all schemes in both urban and rural areas in order to calculate the 
amount of the land contributed.  The value of land was then obtained from valuation 
office agency.  The cost of constructing an affordable unit (excluding land) was 
assumed to be £110,000 (for the 2007/08 study period) for all local authorities in 
England.  Land and construction cost were then adjusted depending on whether 
there was funding available for the affordable dwellings.  For instance, one 
permutation was that for social rented units with no public subsidy, 80% of land was 
assumed to be contributed for free, with developers contributing 20% towards 
construction cost.  For shared ownership units, 60% of land was contributed for 
free, with developers contributing 10% towards construction cost.  Since 2009 there 
have been a number of changes to the affordable housing market that meant the 
approach used in the last survey was no longer directly applicable: 
 
• New tenures, notably Affordable Rent have been introduced;  
• Since the Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix became the Local Authority 
Survey of Housing, there is no detailed information on funding arrangements 
for affordable housing completions; 
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• The regime for public subsidy for acquisition of affordable housing has 
changed dramatically. 
 
3.11 We have used cost and market value approaches to estimate the value of 
affordable housing contributions. The key assumptions made are: 
 
• House prices for new-build private dwellings - These were obtained from the 
Nationwide’s  website  and  disaggregated  to  regional  level.    Data  related  to  
the third quarter of 2011, the mid-point of the 2011/12 time-period of the 
study;   
 
• Proportion of Market Value paid by Registered Provider - These were 
estimated by the research team based upon knowledge and experience of 
market norms. It was assumed that no subsidy is available. 
 
• Land values - These were obtained from the Property Market Report of the 
Valuation Office Agency (at the regional and town level) and from the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (at local authority level);    
 
• Construction cost per square metre - This was obtained from Building Cost 
Information Service (BCIS) data with regional weightings (median five year 
values with an additional 20% for external works and fees); 
• Residential density and dwelling size - These were estimated by the 
research team based upon knowledge and experience of market norms. 
 
3.12 The results for the discounted market value approach are presented in Table 3.3 
(below). 
 
Table 3.3: The Estimated Value of Affordable Housing: 
 Discounted Market Value Approach 
 
Tenure 
Estimated 
Value 
  
Social Rent £1.16bn 
Affordable Rent £440m 
Intermediate rent £110m 
Affordable Home 
Ownership £460m 
Unknown £140m 
  
Total £2.31bn 
 
3.13 To check these results, we also reviewed the cost approach. It is reassuring that the 
both methods produce very similar estimates of the total value of affordable housing 
at £2.3 billion.  This represents a relatively small decrease from a total of £2.6 billion 
in 2007-8.  However, the comparable figure for the number of dwellings given 
planning consent in 2007-8 was over 48,000 compared to circa 32,000 in 2011-12.  
Therefore, between 2007-8 and 2011-12, there was a drop of approximately 11% in 
the value of the planning obligations and a reduction of around one third in the 
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number of dwellings.  Whilst this might seem unexpected, we would point to two 
possible explanations.  Firstly, a substantial majority of affordable housing units 
were in London and the south-east of England where there has either been an 
increase in prices for new properties or the fall has been less pronounced than 
elsewhere in England. Second, an assumption of zero grant was made. 
 
The Estimated Number and Value of Direct Payment 
Planning Obligations 
3.14 Since they are in cash terms, the estimation of the value of direct payment planning 
obligations poses no similar valuation problems.  Figure 3.2 and Table 3.4 set out 
the estimated total value of direct payment obligations.  In total, using the survey 
sample extrapolated by local authority family, it is estimated that just over £1 billion 
of direct payments were received.  The value-activity approach to extrapolation 
provides a very similar overall figure.  Comparable figures were not produced in 
previous studies.   Education and transport accounted for nearly 60% of the total 
direct payments.  Direct payments for affordable housing accounted for nearly £150 
million or around 15% of the total.  In 2011-12, direct payments per local authority 
were just over £3 million which is a drop in comparison with 2007/08 (at £3.5 million 
per local authority) but is higher than in 2003/04 at around £1.5 million and £2.7 
million per local authority in 2005/06.   
  
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Direct Payments by local authority family 
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Table 3.4: Distribution of direct payments by local authority family 
 
 Estimated 
amount 
(£ million) 
% of total 
direct 
payments 
% of local 
authorities 
Rural England £101 10.1% 31.6% 
Rural Towns £73 7.3% 17.5% 
Urban England £126 12.6% 21.8% 
Commuter Belt £63 6.2% 12.3% 
Existing Urban 
Centres 
£41 4.1% 8.9% 
London £598 59.7% 8.0% 
Source: Extrapolated survey sample by local authority family. 
 
3.15 The average values of planning obligations by direct payment are broadly 
consistent with previous studies.  Compared to estimated average direct payments 
per obligation of circa £250,000 in £2003/04, £370,000 in 2005/06 and £592,000 in 
2007/08, the average direct payment for affordable housing in 2011/12 is estimated 
at close to £470,000.  This is consistent with a pattern of progressive increases in 
the value of individual planning obligations prior to the financial crash which was 
associated with increasing land and house prices.  This was followed by a downturn 
in both market activity and prices and a fall in the average value of direct payment 
planning obligations.  A change in the structure of the survey questionnaire in this 
research introduced a separate category for infrastructure.  The large average 
figures for infrastructure reflect a fairly small number of large direct payments.  
  
3.16 Figure 3.3 and Table 3.5 which follows highlights the dominance of the contribution 
made by affordable housing.  The significant increase infrastructure payments in 
2011/12 reflect a very limited number of local authority responses with high 
individual contribution figures.  This may not be representative of any wider trend in 
contributions. 
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Figure 3.3: Type of Direct Contribution by Average Value 2003/04 to 2011/12 
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Table 3.5: The Number and Value of Direct Payment Obligations 
 
 2003-4 2005-6 2007-8 2011-12 
 Average 
Value 
Average 
Value 
Average 
Value 
Number of 
Obligations 
Total Value 
(£ million) 
Average 
Value 
Affordable housing £249,314 £370,232 £591,949  319 £150 £470,000 
Education  £117,132 £83,687 £162,236 1,302 £201 £154,000 
Open space and 
environment 
£24,731 £44,647 £33,390 3,632 £108 £30,000 
Community facilities £58,811 £32,428 £67,649 2,752 £133 £48,000 
Transport and travel £83,125 £76,223 £75,161 2,887 £380 £132,000 
Infrastructure n/a n/a n/a 126 £39 £310,000 
Other £23,159 £27,025 £11,363 150 £30 £200,000 
       
TOTAL     11,167 £1,041 £93,000 
Source: Extrapolated survey sample by local authority family and Department for Communities and Local Government (2005, 2007, 2010) 
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The Estimated Number and Value of In-Kind Planning 
Obligations 
 
3.17 In-kind planning obligations are essentially direct provision of facilities and services 
by the developer.  By far the largest source of in-kind planning obligations – 
affordable housing – has been discussed above.  In this section we focus on other 
types of in-kind provision.   Table 3.6 presents the estimates for the number and 
value of other in-kind planning obligations.  Both methods of extrapolating from the 
questionnaire survey data produce an estimate of value in the region of £80 million 
and an estimate of the total number of obligations in the region of 1300-1500.  In 
line with previous studies, the method used to estimate the value of the individual 
planning obligations was to assume that an in-kind planning obligation had the 
same value as the comparable average direct payment obligation.  Hence, for the 
extrapolation by local authority family of education, the total value of £1,730,484 is 
the product of 11 obligations multiplied by the mean value of a direct payment for 
education which was £162,802.  
 
3.18 It should be acknowledged that there is a potential bias towards underestimation in 
this approach.  In-kind obligations are more likely to be provided by a developer in 
large-scale schemes where the size of the development justifies the direct provision 
of a road, school, health centre etc.  In turn, smaller schemes are more likely to 
involve direct payments since it is not usually practicable to physically provide part 
of a school or a leisure centre etc.  However, in the absence of detailed information 
about the nature of the in-kind obligations, it is difficult to assess the scale of the 
buildings and land that was gained through the planning obligations.   
 
3.19 Table 3.6 displays the estimates of the number and value of in-kind planning 
obligations based on the two methods of extrapolation from the sample.  Transport 
and travel account for approximately half of the number and value of planning 
obligations.  Within this category, the revenue is also highly concentrated.   
Approximately 65% of the revenue is for temporary or permanent highway or traffic 
works.       
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Table 3.6:  The Number and Value of Non-Affordable Housing In-Kind 
Contributions 
 
 Extrapolated by 
local authority family 
Extrapolated by 
value-activity cluster 
Estimated 
no. of 
obligations 
Estimated 
value 
(£ million) 
Estimated 
no. of 
obligations 
Estimated 
value 
(£ million) 
Education  11 £2 9 £1 
Open space and 
environment 
199 £5 228 £6 
Community facilities 380 £26 423 £31 
Transport and Travel 714 £40 805 £41 
Infrastructure  0 £0 0 £0 
Miscellaneous 45 £6 45 £6 
TOTAL 1349 £78 1510 £85 
Source: Extrapolated survey data  
 
3.20 The only other large  concentration  of  revenue  is  in  the  ‘Employment  and  Training’  
sub-category  of  ‘community  facilities’  accounting  for  around  three  quarters  of  all  
revenue in this category.   
 
3.21 In comparison to the period 2007/08, the total value of in-kind contributions for 
responding authorities alone was nearly £145 million in 2007.  This is also 
consistent with a major decrease in the total number of planning obligations. Again, 
the  ‘raw’  survey  result  for  the  2007/08  study  was  3,260  individual  planning  
obligations from responding authorities for in-kind contributions compared to an 
estimated 1,300 to 1,500 obligations in 2011-12.  The extent of this decline is 
notable  when  it  is  pointed  out  that  a  ‘raw’  survey  result  of  3,260  would  have  been  
grossed up to a figure between 8,000-11,000 in-kind planning obligations in the 
2007/08 survey.  
 
3.22 Table 3.7 displays the estimates of the number and value of in-kind planning 
obligations when disaggregated by local authority family. They are consistent with 
the findings of high concentrations of planning obligations in London. It is estimated 
that over 63% of in-kind planning obligations by number and value were received in 
London. 
 
Table 3.7: The Value of In-Kind Planning Obligations 
Local authority family Proportion of obligations Estimated value (£m) 
Rural England 5% £4 
Rural Towns 21% £17 
Urban England 1% £1 
Commuter Belt 7% £6 
Existing Urban Centre 2% £1 
London 63% £49 
TOTAL  100% £78 
Source: Extrapolated survey sample by local authority family 
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The Estimated Quantity and Value of Land Contributions 
 
3.23 In terms of the valuation of land contributions, a crucial assumption concerns the 
estimated value of land.  This is typically a function of its use.  For instance, 
agricultural land currently sells for approximately £15,000 per hectare in England.   
Whilst there are large regional variations, residential land can sell for well over £2 
million per hectare in the south of England and for substantially more in many areas 
of London.  A key issue is what use this land should be allocated for purposes of 
valuation.   
 
3.24 In the previous study for 2007/08, it was assumed that the land contribution should 
be considered as residential land – albeit 15% was assumed to be commercial.  
Although it is not made explicit in the report, there is a strong rationale for this 
approach.  In essence, it is that residential land prices per acre/hectare are based 
on the price paid per acre/hectare of gross developable area.  Since the gross 
developable area includes open space, community facilities, roads and footpaths, 
such areas should be classified as residential land. In this study, it has been 
assumed that the land contributions are valued at £2.5 million per hectare12. 
  
 
Table 3.8:  The Quantity and Value of Land Contributions 
 
 Extrapolated by 
local authority family 
Extrapolated by 
value-activity cluster 
Hectares Estimated 
value 
(£ million) 
Hectares Estimated 
value 
(£ million) 
Affordable Housing 35 £87 35 £87 
Education  9 £244 7 £19 
Open space and 
environment 
48 £120 53 £133 
Community facilities 24 £59 18 £45 
Transport and Travel 8 £21 9 £234 
Infrastructure  0 £0 0 £0 
TOTAL 124 £311 123 £307 
 
 
                                            
 
12 According to DCLG Live Table 563 Housing market: Average valuations of residential building land with 
outline planning permission, the weighted average value for 2009 was £2,700,537 per hectare and in 2010 it 
was £2,367,980 per hectare.  No data are available beyond 2010. 
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3.25 In previous studies in 2007/08 and 2005/06, the values of land contributions were 
estimated at £900m and £960m respectively. Although they accounted for 18% and 
24% of the value of agreed planning obligations in 2007/08 and 2005/06, no 
detailed breakdown was provided for these figures.  The higher 2005/06 figure was 
a  function  of  88  hectares  of  “recorded”  free  land.    It  was  stated that this was 
grossed up and a value of £4 million per hectare applied.    
 
3.26 The relatively small figure for land contribution for affordable housing is surprising.  
It is based on only one positive response.  It is at odds with the local authority 
housing statistics (LAHS).  The local authority housing statistics record 35 hectares 
of free or discounted land for affordable housing generated by 11 local authorities. 
The comparable figure for 2010/11 was 33 hectares. The 2011/12 local authority 
housing statistics figure seems more plausible. Given that the local authority 
housing statistics and the questionnaire survey provide similar overall estimates for 
the number of affordable dwellings, and that previous studies based the valuation of 
affordable housing on Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix (HSSA) figures, it 
seems appropriate to base the valuation of the land for affordable housing on the 
local authority housing statistics result.  
 
3.27 A substantial majority of free or discounted land is provided from  “Open  Space”,  
“Community  Facilities”  and  for  affordable  housing  development  with  relatively  small  
amounts estimated for education and transport. Given that the estimated values in 
previous studies appear to have been based upon a relatively small number of 
obligations in extremely high value areas, the marked drop in the estimated value of 
free or discounted land for 2011/12 is to be expected. It would be surprising if a 
significant proportion of the value of planning obligations were to be generated by 
free or discounted land given the small numbers of obligations that have this type of 
contribution. 
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Part B: Issues in development 
4. Viability, Development and Planning 
Obligations 
Introduction 
 
4.1 This chapter investigates the impact of section 106 agreements on development 
viability across a range of different development types and sizes.  It explores the 
impact  of  affordable  housing  ‘asks’  on  development  along  with  other  section 106 
requirements and considers how this has changed over recent years. 
 
Key findings 
 
• There is an increased emphasis on viability in development planning 
(crystallised in the National Planning Policy Framework) and with it, greater 
attention is paid to viability testing within the planning system. 
 
• The basis of most  viability  testing  is  to  identify  a  scheme’s  residual  value  (i.e.  
revenue less costs) and to compare this with a threshold land value which 
represents the price at which a willing seller will sell their land. 
 
• Reflecting a complex relationship between market values and development 
costs over the last five years, the viability modelling simulations undertaken 
for the study do not suggest that scheme viability deteriorated between 2007 
and 2010. However, some sites which were viable in 2010 may not be now 
as build costs have started to rise. 
 
• Various factors such as increased finance costs and an extended 
development/sales period will have a negative impact on viability. These can 
be expected to vary from scheme to scheme with some developers needing 
to borrow all the development finance and others having access to 
equity/cash.  Longer sales periods need not have a negative impact on 
scheme viability if units do not need to be developed before they are sold.  
This is likely to be more of a problem on flatted schemes. 
 
• Urban extensions have substantial additional costs which can make it difficult 
to achieve a viable scheme.  Removing affordable housing obligations will 
not always turn a non-viable scheme into a viable one. 
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The Basis of Development Viability in Real Estate Markets 
 
4.2 Development viability appraisal and its methods are based on the premise that the 
value of a development project or site is taken as the monetary surplus (sometime 
called a residual surplus) available once a site has been developed.  This monetary 
surplus is a product of the difference between the value of the assets created by 
development and the cost of creating the assets.  A development opportunity is 
viable if the projected revenues from a development scheme are sufficient to justify 
incurring the costs of development.  Ignoring planning obligations for the moment, 
these costs typically include: 
 
• a sufficient return to site owners to incentivise them to release their sites 
for development (normally expressed as a residual land value); 
• a range of development costs (site preparation, construction, professional  
fees, stamp duty, marketing and leasing etc.); 
• a sufficient return to developers to provide an incentive for them to 
undertake development. 
 
In a contested real estate development market, any expected monetary surplus 
remaining after expected costs of development, including a sufficient return to the 
developer, should flow to the landowner.  In short: 
 
Site Value = Expected Development Revenues – (Expected Development Costs + 
Required Return to Developer) 
 
4.3 If the monetary surplus of revenue versus costs is sufficient to provide an incentive 
for the landowner to sell a site then the development is viable.  In most contexts the 
appropriate benchmark will be the amount that the landowner could exchange a site 
for in its current or likely alternative use.  As explored further below, planning 
obligations can affect two of the crucial determinants of viability; costs and 
revenues.    
 
Previous Research: A Brief Review 
 
4.4 There has been some published research on the way in which planning obligations 
may affect development viability.  Nearly two decades ago, Healey, Ennis and 
Purdue (1995)13  pointed out that policies on planning obligations were likely to 
have variable impacts on development viability both over space and time. Healey et 
al (1995) inferred that projects more likely to be viable at significant levels of 
planning obligations are likely to display the following characteristics: 
 
• standardised development (e.g. housing units) 
• large sites 
• few site problems (e.g. greenfield, cleared site) 
                                            
 
13 Healey, P. Purdue, M. and Ennis, F. (1996) Negotiating development: planning gain and mitigating 
impacts, Journal of Property Research, 13, 143-160 
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• low current use value 
• strong market conditions 
• large developer with ready access to capital 
 
It was argued that more marginal sites will display: 
 
• complex development (e.g. mixed use) 
• high and unpredictable costs 
• site problems (e.g. topography, pollution, existing buildings) 
• weak market conditions 
• small developer with limited financial backing 
 
4.5 Recent research by Crosby, McAllister and Wyatt (2013)14  and Coleman, McAllister 
and Wyatt (forthcoming)15 has identified a number of problems with development 
viability modelling and its particular application in the English planning system. The 
research argues that a fundamental problem is that development viability models 
test whether policies regarding planning obligations that will be implemented in the 
future, on actual schemes on actual sites, are viable at present using hypothetical 
schemes on hypothetical sites.  They stress the importance in such models of the 
assumption of the level of, what is termed, Threshold Land Value – the price at 
which it is assumed sites will be released for development by their owners.   
 
4.6 One of the key terms in the National Planning Policy Framework was  a  ‘competitive  
return  to  a  willing  landowner’  – this is essentially Threshold Land Value.  In terms of 
defining a willing landowner, Leunig (2011)16 highlighted the heterogeneity of site 
owners’  circumstances  on  a  spectrum  from  owners  who  will  not  sell  at  any  price,  to  
distressed sellers who will sell at a small margin above value in current use.  
Complications can arise where landowners are set on achieving (higher) historic 
site  prices  and  identify  their  required  return  accordingly.  Some  landowners’  
expectations regarding levels of return will have been formed in a specific set of 
market and regulatory conditions.  In many cases in the past these conditions have 
created substantial value uplifts when planning permissions are granted.  In 
particular, landowners may prone to loss aversion.  Whilst outside the scope of this 
report, it has been found in housing markets that property owners are less willing or 
able to accept market prices in the down part of a cycle resulting in drops in market 
turnover and trading volume.  
 
4.7 A willing seller is defined by the International Valuation Standards Council as: 
“...neither  an  over  eager  nor  a  forced  seller  prepared  to  sell  at  any  price,  nor  one  
prepared to hold out for a price not considered reasonable in the current market. 
The willing seller is motivated to sell the asset at market terms for the best price 
attainable in the open market after proper marketing, whatever that price may be. 
                                            
 
14 Crosby, N., McAllister, P. and Wyatt, P. (2013) Fit For Planning? An Evaluation of the Application of 
Development Viability Appraisal in the UK, Environment and Planning B, 40, 1, 3-22 
15 Coleman, C., McAllister, P. and Wyatt, P.(2013) Fit for Policy?  Some Evidence on the Application of 
Development Viability Modelling in the UK Planning System, Town Planning Review, 84, 495-521 
16 Leunig, T. (2011) Community Land Auctions: Working Towards Implementation, CentreForum, London. 
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The factual circumstances of the actual owner are not a part of this consideration 
because the willing  seller  is  a  hypothetical  owner”17  
 
4.8 In the context of the land market there are many imperfections that challenge the 
concept of a willing seller.  Landowners are monopoly owners (each site is unique) 
of a scarce resource and many are able to benefit from increasing asset values 
without the need to realise the gains.  Landowners that are engaged in 
development are able to benefit from this investment activity as well as realise 
profits from development activity.  The land market is, essentially, able to produce 
reward in two ways: through land investment or speculation (from simple land 
holding and land banking through to option activity) and through development 
activity.  The economic drivers and motivations behind these activities are complex 
and exacerbated by shifting regulatory policy but, in a market where prices are 
rising, it can make sense to develop, and when prices are falling it can make sense 
to wait.  This has the effect of accentuating the swings in land prices. 
 
4.9 Putting aside the significant uncertainty about required return to landowner, at a 
given point in time the other inputs to a viability assessment can be estimated with a 
reasonable degree of rigour, but still with a degree of uncertainty.  However, since 
planning obligations are paid for from the difference between development values 
and costs, it is clear that, because of large variation in potential development 
revenues and the extent of abnormal development costs on sites, the potential of 
development to generate land value uplifts can vary.  Consequently the ability of 
sites to generate planning obligations can vary substantially between sites, 
neighbourhoods, towns, cities and parts of the country. Furthermore the viability of 
a site will change as expected development costs and revenues change over time. 
 
Simulation of viability models 
 
4.10 To illustrate the viability issues outlined above, we looked in more detail at a 
number of simulations of development viability. We explored how the market 
downturn of 2008/09 and subsequent changes in costs and prices have affected the 
viability of different types and densities of development across a range of locations.   
We then used this information to help explain how, in different locations and 
housing markets, planning obligations have a differing ability to impact on the 
willingness of developers to make progress with their developments and 
landowners to bring forward their land. 
 
4.11 The analysis uses two notional one-hectare development sites of 35 and 55 units 
and examines viability in high, medium and low-value areas in England and in one 
London Borough. Tunbridge Wells, Tewkesbury, Coventry and Brent were selected 
as representative of their respective price bands. A 3,000 unit large-scale strategic 
greenfield site in Tewkesbury (the medium-value area) was also modelled. 
 
                                            
 
17   IVSC (2011) International Valuation Standards 2011, International Valuation Standards CounCommunity 
Infrastructure Levy, p21 
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4.12 House prices and build costs have changed since the housing market peak of 
2007/08.  As shown in Figure 4.1, house prices have moved at different rates in 
different regions. House prices in London and the South East in the third quarter of 
2011 were above their fourth quarter 2007 level, in the South West and East of 
England they were broadly comparable with their fourth quarter 2007 levels and in 
all other regions house prices were lower in 2011 than in the fourth quarter of 2007.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: House price change 2007-111  
 
 
    Source: Based on DCLG live table 506 
 
4.13 Focusing on housing starts in 2011/12 compared with 2007/08 it would appear that 
there is some relationship (though not necessarily causal) between house price 
change and house building activity.  Figure 4.2 shows total housing starts in 
2007/08 compared with 2011/12.  Those areas where house prices in 2011 were 
below house prices in 2007 had experienced the greatest fall in new house building 
in 2011/12.  Nationally housing starts were down by 40% but in London and South 
East, and South West and East of England housing starts fell by 30% whereas in 
the Rest of England housing starts fell by 48%.    
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Figure 4.2: Housing starts 2011/12 compared with 2007/08 
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4.14 We have used Land Registry data at County level to derive 2012 house prices for 
the specimen local authorities. In Tunbridge Wells house prices rose from 2007 to 
2010.  In Brent they were stable and in Tewkesbury and Coventry they fell.  
Comparing 2012 with 2007 in Brent house prices in 2012 were 9% higher than in 
2007, in Tunbridge Wells they were the same in both years and in Tewkesbury and 
Coventry house prices in 2012 were 6% lower than in 2007. 
 
Table 4.1: House price change 2007 to 2012 (median house prices) 
 
£000  2007 2010 2011 2012 
Brent 280 280 300 306 
Tunbridge 
Wells 
242 253 238 240 
Tewkesbury 197 190 184 185 
Coventry 130 122 122 123 
Source DCLG live table 582 2007 to 2011 and Land Registry 2012 
 
4.15 According to the Building Cost Information Service Tender Price Indices, build costs 
nationally fell by 13% between 2007 and 2010 and have since risen by 2%.  The 
Tender Price Indices does not identify separate price changes at local level 
although it does recognise that prices vary by location.  In 2012 base build cost per 
square metre for a house was £941 in Tunbridge Wells, £923 in Brent, £855 in 
Coventry and £821 in Tewkesbury18.   
 
4.16 There is no apparent correlation between house prices and build costs.  Comparing 
our two representative high value areas, Brent and Tunbridge Wells, house prices 
                                            
 
18 Based on Q2 2012, general estate housing, median results from the last five years. No allowance for 
external works in the figures quoted above.  For modelling purposes base build costs have been uplifted by 
15% to allow for external works. 
 52 
are higher in Brent but build costs are lower.  A similar comparison between low 
value Coventry and medium value Tewkesbury shows that house prices are higher 
in Tewkesbury but build costs are lower.   
 
4.17 Other changes which might be expected to affect viability include changes in 
interest rates and profit margins expected by banks before they will lend and 
changes in rate of sale.  In the base model a profit margin of 20% of gross 
development value and an interest rate of 7.5% per annum are assumed but the 
impact of a lower profit margin (17% of gross development value and interest rate 
(6% per annum) for 2007 were tested. Also in the base model, it was assumed that 
both the 55-unit and 35-unit schemes are developed and sold in one year.  As a 
sensitivity check the impact of a slower sales rate on the 55-unit scheme was tested 
(i.e. assuming that it would take two years to sell in 2012). 
 
4.18 The affordable housing target for each local authority was taken from relevant 
development plans or supporting documents.  These targets varied from 50% in 
Brent, 40% in Tunbridge Wells, 30% in Tewkesbury and 25% in Coventry.  We 
assumed a mix of affordable rented and low-cost home ownership housing as 
specified in the local plan; ranging from two thirds to three quarters rent with the 
highest proportion of low cost home ownership (one third) in Coventry.  In each 
case, 2012 affordable rents were modelled as specified on the local authority 
website.   
 
4.19 Affordable rent was not relevant before 2011; the rental tenure was social rent, and 
at much lower rental levels.  Therefore, the results for 2007 and 2010 would seem 
to overstate rental income (and hence residual value per hectare).  However, at that 
time, grant was far more likely to be available, thus raising residual values.  We 
have therefore taken the view that modelling affordable rent pre and post-2011 
provides results on a broadly similar basis. 
 
Results of viability modelling 
 
4.20 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of the base modelling on the one-hectare site 
on a 55-unit and 35-unit basis in the four specimen local authorities in 2007, 2010 
and 2012.  The main assumptions used in the viability modelling were: 
 
• Expected development values: aggregates of market house prices (based on 
average Land Registry prices) and capitalised net affordable rents for 
affordable housing (based on Valuation Office Agency data). 
 
• Expected development costs: build costs (based on building cost information 
service 5-year median values for each location) and a standard set of other 
development cost assumptions. 
 
• Required return to developer: for market housing 20% of gross development 
value and for affordable  housing  a  6%  contractor’s  return.     
 
• Required return to site owner: modelling identifies the residual value for each 
scheme but does not attempt to compare with a threshold land value. 
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• Level of planning obligations: policy compliant % of affordable housing and a 
notional £7,500 section 106 contributions and/or equivalent Community 
Infrastructure Levy payment assumed. 
 
4.21 The impact on scheme viability from changes in the two key variables of build costs 
and market values between 2007 and 2012 are shown in tables 4.2 and 4.3 and 
illustrated in figures 4.3 and 4.4.   
 
Table 4.2: Results of viability modelling 55-unit site on base assumptions 
 (residual land value per hectare) 
 
  2007 2010 2012 
Brent £5.6m £6.4m £7m 
Tunbridge 
Wells 
£2.5m £3.7m £3.3m 
Tewkesbury £0.3m £0.8m £0.6m 
Coventry £-1.8m £-1.2m £-1.3m 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3:  55 dwellings per hectare site – Residual land value per hectare 2007-12 
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Table 4.3: Results of viability modelling 35 dwellings per hectare site base 
assumptions (residual land value per hectare) 
 
  2007 2010 2012 
Brent na na na 
Tunbridge 
Wells 
£2.6m £3.5m £3.1m 
Tewkesbury £0.7m £1m £0.8m 
Coventry £-1.2m £-0.7m £-0.8m 
Note: 35-unit scheme not modelled in Brent 
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Figure 4.4:  35 dwellings per hectare site - Residual land value per ha 2007-
2012 
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4.22 The following key points are demonstrated in tables 4.2 and 4.3 and figures 4.3 and 
4.4: 
• In Brent residual land value was higher in 2012 than in 2010 and in 2010 
than in 2007. 
 
• In Tunbridge Wells and Tewkesbury residual land values peaked in 2010. 
 
• In Coventry residual land values were negative for both mixes in all three 
years with 25% affordable housing but they produce a more favourable result 
in 2010 and 2012 than in 2007.   
 
4.23 These results are not surprising given that, in all three locations, build costs fell 
between 2007 and 2010 and that, where house prices fell over the same period, the 
fall was less than the fall in build costs.  House prices fell between 2010 and 2012 
in all locations except Brent and there was a marginal increase in build costs.  
Hence the deterioration in residual land values since 2010.  
 
Changes in profit margins and interest rates  
 
4.24 Developers have argued that banks now seek higher profit margins and lend at 
higher interest rates than they did during the house price boom.  We therefore 
modelled the impact on viability of the 55-unit scheme, of reducing interest rates to 
6% per annum and profit margin on market housing to 17% of gross development 
value for 2007 only.  This more closely approximates to the conditions prevailing 
prior to the 2008 banking crisis. The impact on viability is to raise residual land 
values in 2007 by around £300,000 per hectare. (e.g. for Tunbridge Wells residual 
land value in 2007 rises to  £2.8m which is still lower than the £3.7m which the site 
would have achieved in 2010, for Tewkesbury residual value rises to £0.6m which is 
still lower than the £0.8m which the site would have achieved in 2010).   
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Changes in development period 
 
4.25 We also tested the impact of a slower pace of development, again focussing on the 
55-unit scheme, taking Tewkesbury as an example and assuming that the scheme 
could be built out and sold in one year in 2007, but takes two years in 2012.  Much 
depends on the assumption made about the proportion of units that are built in one 
year and sold in the following year.  If half the units are built and sold in year one 
and half are built and sold in year two viability is broadly unchanged but if 30 units 
are built in year one and only 18 are sold then residual land value for the 
Tewkesbury scheme in 2012 is reduced by £55,000 per ha from £600,000 to 
£545,000.   
 
Predominantly flatted schemes  
 
4.26 Flatted schemes figure prominently in the Glenigan stalled sites data (see Chapter 
5 for details), accounting for two thirds of all stalled sites.  It is not possible to tell 
from the Glenigan data whether such schemes are predominantly flatted or simply 
contain flats.  In order to test if predominantly flatted schemes are less viable than 
schemes of the same density which contain a higher proportion of terraced units we 
modelled a 55-unit scheme which is predominantly (60%) flats.  We modelled this 
scheme in Tunbridge Wells and Tewkesbury.  The results are shown in table 4.4 
(which can be compared with Table 4.2 above). 
 
Table 4.4:  55-unit predominantly flatted (residual land value per hectare) 
 
  2007 2010 2012 
Tunbridge 
Wells 
£2.4m £3.4m £3.0m 
Tewkesbury £0.9m £1.3m £1.0m 
 
• In Tunbridge Wells residual values for the 55-unit predominantly flatted 
scheme are lower than for the 55-unit scheme which is predominantly 
terraced.  
 
• In Tewkesbury residual values are higher for the predominantly flatted 
scheme than for the predominantly terraced scheme 
 
Modelling a Large-scale Urban Extension 
 
4.27 Large-scale (greenfield) developments (typically coming forward as urban 
extensions) have additional costs that can affect viability.  To test this, a notional 
scheme of 3,000 units in Tewkesbury (a medium value area) was modelled, using 
the following assumptions:  
 
• Large urban extensions have significant site opening up costs when 
compared with smaller urban and edge of settlement sites.  We model these 
at £15,000 per dwelling. Opening up costs are also front loaded which 
impacts on cash flow because substantial costs are incurred before revenue 
comes in thereby increasing interest charges.  We model total site opening 
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up costs in the first two years of the scheme although we sensitivity test a 
phased development with half the opening up costs occurring later in the 
scheme.   
 
• Large-scale strategic sites also tend to have greater requirements for 
infrastructure (on and/or off site) than smaller sites and these may be 
provided through section 106 agreements, via Community Infrastructure 
Levy funding or through additional development costs. To reflect this, we 
have modelled the urban extension with section 106 obligations of £15,000 
per dwelling.   
 
• The net-to-gross ratio for developable land is lower for large-scale 
developments than for smaller sites.  We assume a net to gross ratio of 65%.  
 
• We assumed £795 per dwelling for the proposed changes to the building 
regulations post 2013.   
 
• We assume a 10-year development period with 6 developers on site. 
 
4.28 The combined effect of these changes is a significant reduction in residual land 
value. At 30% affordable housing the 3,000 unit urban extension in Tewkesbury 
produces a negative residual land value of between £40m and £60m depending on 
the development period and discount rate assumed.  With zero affordable housing 
residual value is £0 to -£20m.   
 
4.29 We tested the effect of phasing site opening up costs and allocating half the site 
opening up costs to year five.  This reduces the negative residual value with 100% 
market housing to -£12m but does not generate a surplus. 
 
4.30 This analysis highlights the point that the relationship between house price and 
build cost change is different in different locations and between different types and 
densities of development.  Various other factors such as increased finance costs 
are common to all types of development and will have a negative impact on viability.  
Longer sales periods need not have a negative impact on viability if units do not 
need to be built before they are sold.  This is less likely to be the case with flatted 
schemes.  Urban extensions have substantial additional costs which can make it 
difficult to achieve a viable scheme.   
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5. Planning Obligations and Stalled Sites 
Introduction 
 
5.1 As stated in Chapter 2, the research found that 45 (36%) local authorities had 
renegotiated section 106 planning agreements during 2011-12. This indicates there 
is a degree of flexibility among local authorities, with nearly all requests to 
renegotiate section 106 agreements in this period leading to a change in the 
planning agreement.    
 
5.2 This  Chapter  addresses  the  question  ‘What  is  the  relative  importance  of  planning  
obligations  in  stalling  development?’  and  considers,  in  detail,  the  reasons  why  sites  
have stalled and the ways in which (re)negotiation may help to bring sites forward.  
 
5.3 In order to address this research question, the Chapter draws upon two main data 
sources (and is structured to report on the findings from each): 
 
• Glenigan’s  national  database  of  construction  projects 
 
• a case study analysis of stalled sites 
 
Key Findings 
• There are a number of potential approaches to defining stalled sites.  In this 
study, a stalled site is defined as a site with planning permission for a 
scheme or a resolution to grant planning permission that has not been 
implemented for at least a year. 
 
• Data from Glenigan shows that: 
o stalled residential developments account for 94% of stalled sites 
o approximately two thirds of stalled residential schemes are apartment-
led developments 
o the majority of stalled sites are brownfield, are located in urban areas 
and are in low value areas 
 
• However, 71% of stalled dwellings in case studies put forward for this study 
were in urban extensions. 
 
• The case study analysis suggests that the reasons for sites stalling are often 
complex and it is difficult to identify a single reason that stalls sites.  It would 
be an oversimplification to assume that a significant cause of development 
delay was intransigence on either the part of the planning authority or the 
applicant.   
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Defining stalled sites 
 
5.4 Defining  what  is  meant  by  a  ‘stalled  site’  is  an  important  first  stage  in  investigating  
the contribution of planning obligations to causing their lack of headway in the 
development process.  The definition of a stalled site has guided the research on 
where  to  ‘shine  the  torch’  in  terms  of  identifying  causation.     
 
5.5 It is important to recognise, when explaining why a development scheme is stalled, 
that certain factors may have different levels of significance at different stages in the 
site  supply  ‘pipeline’.      For  instance,  otherwise  suitable  sites  (in  planning  terms)  may  
not be promoted through the planning system because the level of planning 
obligations set out in Development Plan policies renders them financially unviable.  
Later  in  the  planning  ‘pipeline’,  a  site  about  which  the local planning authority and 
developer cannot settle the Heads of Terms of the section 106 agreement at pre-
application, may mean that an application fails to be submitted.   Alternatively, a site 
that seems to be stalled relatively soon after the developer has signed a section 
106 agreement is more likely to be failing to progress to construction for reasons 
unrelated to the section 106 agreement. 
 
5.6 The Get Britain Building definition of a stalled site is clear:   
“Stalled  sites  (which  could  be  a  standalone  phase  within  a  wider  scheme)  will  be  
defined as those where there has been no construction activity on the relevant 
phase since 1 September 2011 (excluding site clearance / remediation, affordable 
housing delivery construction where it has been possible to progress this in 
advance of other elements of the site and / or limited activity to implement or 
maintain  a  planning  permission).” 
 
5.7 Whilst the specific date (1 September 2011) is included in this definition for 
operational reasons, the key point to note is that a site should be inactive but 
‘shovel  ready’,  with  planning  permission,  including  a  section 106 agreement, in 
place.  In essence, a stalled site is defined broadly as a scheme with planning 
permission that is NOT being implemented.   
 
5.8 Whilst acknowledging that the definition is contestable, for the purposes of this 
study we have closely followed the Get Britain Building definition and defined a 
stalled site as a site with planning permission for a scheme or a resolution to grant 
planning permission that has not been implemented for about a year or more. 
 
Numbers, Location and Types of Stalled Sites – The 
Glenigan Dataset 
The dataset  
 
5.9 A data set of stalled sites was obtained from Glenigan.  It comprises 1,411 sites 
totalling 75,534 units and an estimated £8,959m of gross development value as at 
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July 2012 (Source: Glenigan).19   Of the 1,411 sites, the majority (1,217) involve 
new developments.  Of the remainder, 46 were extensions and 148 were 
refurbishments.  The dates of the planning applications relevant to the schemes 
ranged from August 2000 to the March 2012, a time period of 11.5 years.  All were 
classified  as  ‘large’  by  Glenigan;;  meaning  that  they  related  to developments other 
than changes of use and minor works such as extensions.  Permission dates 
ranged from 06/07/01 to 29/05/12 (4 records without permission dates). 
 
5.10 The vast majority of stalled developments were residential-led (either apartments or 
houses) and these are the focus of subsequent analysis.   Stalled residential 
developments accounted for 94% of the sites and 95% of the units.  Figure 5.1 and 
Table 5.1 show that two thirds of stalled residential schemes were apartment-led 
developments. 
 
Figure 5.1: Number of stalled units by type of scheme – July 2012 
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19 Glenigan is a private sector provider of development market information including planning applications, 
permissions, construction tenders, contracts and completions.  For the purposes of this project Glenigan 
supplied a snapshot of data that described the  nature,  scale  and  location  of  ‘stalled’  development  schemes  
as at July 2012. 
 60 
 
Table 5.1: Number of stalled sites and units, classified by type of scheme – July 
2012 
 
Predominant use Number 
of sites 
Number of 
units 
Ave 
units 
per 
site 
RESIDENTIAL:     
Apartments, flats 735 44,972 63% 61 
Houses / bungalows, chalets / luxury 
housing 
499 23,771 33% 48 
Sheltered housing /elderly persons homes 
/ nursing homes 
57 1,399 2% 25 
Student accommodation 40 1,679 2% 42 
TOTAL20 1,331 71,821 100%  
COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL AND 
OTHER: 
    
Shopping centres / shops / supermarkets 13 1,011   
Shipping terminals / ports 1 774   
Offices 8 736   
Residential outlines 2 364   
Hotels / motels 7 283   
Warehousing, storage / workshops / light 
industrial 
6 213   
Homes and hostels  6 96   
Misc 37 190   
TOTAL 80 3,667   
     
TOTAL 1,411 75,488   
 
 
5.11 Figure 5.2 shows the numbers of stalled schemes categorised by the date of 
planning permission.  Not unexpectedly, a small proportion of stalled sites (in July 
2012) were granted planning permission in the pre-crisis period. In 2008-9, there 
was a significant increase in the numbers of sites stalled that were granted 
permission in these years.  This shift continued for 2010 and 2011.  However, given 
that the planning permissions were relatively recent, a proportion of the non-
implemented  planning  permissions  may  have  been  due  to  ‘normal’  delays  in  
construction procurement, execution of sales to house builders etc., rather than any 
fundamental problems with the schemes.  It is also possible that a proportion of 
planning permissions granted in 2010 and 2011 were renewals or changes to 
existing schemes. 
                                            
 
20 Includes conversions and refurbishments. Of the 1,331 sites, 1217 sites relate to new development. 
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Figure 5.2: Unimplemented Planning Permissions - July 2012 
(Categorised by year panning permission granted) 
 
 
 
 
5.12 Residential sites were linked to the UK Postcode Directory using the postcode as 
the common identifier.  Not all sites had a valid postcode (there were 128 
mismatches).  Table 5.2 shows that the vast majority of the stalled sites were 
located within urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more and in a less 
sparsely populated hinterland.  This rather vague definition comes from the UK 
Postcode Directory and is based on an Ordnance Survey classification but it 
illustrates that the majority were located on brownfield sites.  Because such sites 
typically attract a higher existing use value than greenfield sites and are more likely 
to have some kind of abnormal development cost, they tend to be more marginal in 
terms of financial viability.  It is therefore not surprising that most of the stalled sites 
were brownfield. 
 
 62 
Table 5.2: Stalled Sites by Settlement Type – July 2012 
 
Geographical location Units Sites 
Urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more 
and the wider surrounding area is sparsely populated 
50 0% 4 0% 
Small town and fringe areas category and the wider 
surrounding area is sparsely populated  
93 0% 7 1% 
Village and the wider surrounding area is sparsely 
populated 
199 0% 11 1% 
Hamlet or isolated dwelling and the wider surrounding 
area is sparsely populated  
86 0% 5 0% 
Urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more 
and the wider surrounding area is less sparsely 
populated 
51,519 72% 969 73% 
Small town and fringe areas and the wider surrounding 
area is less sparsely populated 
2433 3% 91 7% 
Village and the wider surrounding area is less sparsely 
populated 
2,450 3% 68 5% 
Hamlet or isolated dwelling and the wider surrounding 
area is less sparsely populated  
1,076 1% 38 3% 
Scotland/NI/Channel Is/IoM 919 1% 10 1% 
No information available 13,040 18% 128 10% 
Grand Total 71,865  1,331  
 
 
5.13 Figure 5.3 shows the location of the Glenigan-recorded stalled sites (the red 
circles).  The size of the circles is proportionate to the number of units proposed at 
each site.  Underneath the circles is a choropleth map showing the price per 
hectare  of  ‘bulk’  housing  land  (land  parcels  in  excess  of  two  hectares)  as  estimated  
by the Valuation Office Agency (2010 values).  The map overlay reveals how the 
vast majority of stalled residential development sites are located in the low land 
value areas. 
 
5.14 Of the 1,331 residential sites that were stalled, 735 were apartment developments.  
23 of these have not been assigned to a specific region by Glenigan.  Of the 712 
that have been allocated to a region, the split is as follows: 
 
High value areas (London and the South East)    32% 
 
Medium value areas (East of England and the South West)  23% 
 
Rest of England        45% 
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Figure 5.3: Location of stalled sites in relation to the value of housing land – July 
2012 
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Case studies 
 
5.15 The purpose of the case study investigation was to examine in-depth the factors 
that cause sites to be stalled.   
 
Sampling and Method 
 
5.16 It was anticipated that 18-20 case studies would provide an adequate sample to 
obtain evidence of the factors that can stall development.  However, it is important 
to point out that the aim of the research is to provide an in-depth evaluation of each 
site rather than to generate a sample that could be used to make inferences 
regarding significant differences between different categories of site.  Whilst an 
attempt was made to cover a range of value areas and size of schemes, it is not 
possible to make any inferences about differences in the role of planning obligations 
between the categories of site.  Put simply, the case studies will not provide 
answers  to  questions  such  as  “Are  planning  obligations  having  different  types  of  
impact  in  large/low  value/mixed  use  sites,  etc?”   
 
The Initial Sample 
 
5.17 The sample of stalled sites was generated from a combination of sites suggested by 
local planning authorities, developers, the research project advisory group and 
personal knowledge of the research team.  It needs to be recognised that the 
composition of the sample was not based on random sampling but reflected the 
willingness of individuals to put forward examples. 
 
5.18 The sample of stalled sites was separate from the Glenigan dataset and was 
constructed for the purposes of this study only. 
 
5.19 The definition used for the case studies was based on the Get Britain Building 
definition of stalled sites but also included sites with a resolution to grant panning 
permission but a delay in finalising the section 106 agreement. The full definition for 
the case study sites was: 
 
Stalled sites (which could be a standalone phase within a wider scheme) are 
defined as either: 
x Sites with planning permission and section 106 in place, where there has been 
no construction activity on the relevant phase since 1 September 2011 
(excluding site clearance / remediation, and / or limited activity to implement or 
maintain a planning permission). 
x Sites where there is a resolution to grant permission but a delay in finalising 
the section 106 (say of a year or more). 
 
5.20 The case study sample is summarised in the table below with a short commentary 
about the characteristics of the sample.  We divided the country into three broad 
value areas: 
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• ‘High’  – London, South East 
• ‘Medium’  – South West and East of England  
• ‘Low’  – rest of England 
 
However, as each case study was submitted, we reviewed whether it was within a 
local authority which was either of a much higher or lower value than the majority of 
local authorities in the value band.  If this was the case, and using judgement, we 
allocated the case study to a more appropriate value band.  Schemes were defined 
as being either large (100 dwellings or more) or small (less than 100 dwellings). 
 
5.21 Table 5.3 shows the total number of dwellings in case study schemes for each 
house price band, in three types of location; urban, suburban and urban extensions 
(the latter typically large-scale greenfield developments on the edge of an existing 
settlement).  For each value band and location type (e.g. urban in the high house 
price band), the table shows the number of case study schemes in the sample. 
 
Table 5.3: Possible Case Studies by Location and Value Area (number  
of dwellings in italics) 
 
 Urban Suburban Urban  
extension 
Total 
schemes 
Total 
dwellings 
High house price 3,600  1,600  10,500  43 15,700 
Large 9 2   4  15   
Small 18 (in 6 
LAs) 
10 (in 3 
LAs) 
 28  
Medium house 
price 
3,500  2,400  15,000  36 20,900 
Large  7 1 9 17  
Small 8 11 (in 5 
LAs) 
 19  
Low house price 3,900  700  13,500  59 18,100 
Large 12 2 7 21  
Small 26 12  38  
      
Total schemes  80 38 20 138  
Total dwellings 11,000 4,700 39,000  54,700 
 
5.22 The initial sample of stalled sites had the following characteristics: 
 
• 43% were in low house price areas compared to 31% in high price areas and 
26% in medium price areas. 
 
• However, the incidence of dwellings in stalled sites was slightly different with 
fewer dwellings (33%) in the low price areas and more dwellings (38%) in the 
medium price area. 
 
• Urban extensions accounted for 15% of all sites but 71% of all dwellings and 
ranged in size from under 1,000 units to more than 4,000 units. This is a very 
different picture from that drawn from the Glenigan data and may reflect the 
bias  and  interest  of  those  who  responded  to  the  ‘call  for  sites’. 
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• 28% of all dwellings in stalled sites were located in suburban areas, 58% 
were in urban areas. 
 
• Few examples of stalled sites in London were put forward as potential case 
studies. 
 
• There were 11 non-residential stalled schemes; six of these were in high 
price areas, four in medium value areas and only one in low value areas. 
 
 
Case Study Selection and Interview 
 
5.23 From the initial sample of 138 suggested case studies, 18 were selected for more 
detailed assessment.  They were selected to represent a spread of location types 
(urban, suburban, greenfield/urban extension) within each of the three broad value 
areas. 
 
5.24 For the vast majority of the selected case studies, both the local planning authority  
and site promoter (developer/landowner) were interviewed.  In some cases 
developers or landowners declined to be interviewed and these case studies were 
replaced with a similar alternative case study from the sample.  In the event, there 
remained a couple of case studies where interviews with both local planning 
authority and scheme promoter were not possible but the research team felt they 
had sufficient and balanced information to proceed.  
 
5.25 The interviews were conducted by telephone (or in a very small number of cases, 
face to face) during October and November 2012 using a semi structured agenda.  
Two researchers were present at most of the interviews which were informal and 
exploratory.  Given issues of commercial and negotiating sensitivity, all interviewees 
were assured that they would remain anonymous and no site or individual would be 
identifiable when the results were reported. 
 
Detailed Case Study Results 
The Sites 
 
5.26 A broad range of sites in terms of location and size were selected, including large, 
urban extensions, incorporating community and commercial facilities as well as 
large residential elements.  The largest schemes had over 3,000 dwellings. 
 
5.27 The size of schemes by number of dwellings is shown in Table 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67 
Table 5.4: Number of Dwellings in Case Study Schemes 
 
Number of dwellings Number of case studies 
Less than 50 4 
50 – 99 2 
100 – 499 4 
500 – 999 4 
1,000 or more 4 
 
5.28 Schemes were selected from across the three value bands (low, medium, high) – 
broadly representative of their proportions in the sample of 138 schemes: 
 
• 7  high value areas 
• 4  medium value areas 
• 7  low value areas 
 
Site characteristics 
 
5.29 When selecting the case studies for interview, we could not identify the setting or 
site type (e.g. urban regeneration scheme, edge of market town greenfield site )21.  
In the event, the 18 case studies fell into the following broad categories (the 
definitions have been devised for this study): 
 
• Large-scale strategic greenfield development (1,000 or more dwellings) 4 
• Significant greenfield scheme with 100 or more dwellings   4 
• Small greenfield scheme (99 or fewer dwellings)    2 
• Large urban redevelopment/regeneration site (100+ dwellings)  3 
• Small urban redevelopment/ regeneration site (99 or fewer dwellings) 4 
• Urban infill – ‘clean  site’        1 
 
5.30 The greenfield schemes are similar in character; housing developments adjoining 
an existing settlement.  Depending on their scale, they include different types/levels 
of provision of transport, community and other facilities as well as dedicated open 
space.   
 
5.31 The previously developed sites are more diverse in character.  They include heavily 
contaminated and difficult to develop former factory sites in densely urban (city 
centre) locations. There are also examples of small (e.g. for 50 dwellings) 
redevelopment schemes where demolition of the existing building (e.g. a former pub 
or hotel) is part of the planning permission and of urban infill schemes where little is 
required to bring the site forward for development and development conditions are 
benign. 
 
                                            
 
21 The exception was the large scale strategic sites readily identified by the dwelling numbers. 
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Scheme Histories and Reasons for Delays 
 
5.32 It is not possible to provide a simple analysis of the dates when the case studies 
were  first  ‘promoted’  for  development  since  some  schemes  were  allocated  in  a  
development  plan  and  others  were  ‘windfall  sites’  (and  so  the  first  time  they  are  
identified to the planning authority is as a planning application is being made).  
There can also be complications where the extant planning permission is not the 
first permission granted on the site.  However, Table 5.5 gives an indication of the 
length of time since the case studies first secured planning permission and when 
the case study interviews were undertaken (2012).   
 
Table 5.5: Length of time since (outline) planning permission 22 
 
Number of years Number of case 
studies 
Less than 2 3 
3 to 5 8 
6 or more 3 
Not yet permitted23 3 
 
 
5.33 The majority of the case studies had been granted planning permission within the 
last  five  years  but  three  had  ‘older’  planning  permissions.    It  is  important  to  bear  in  
mind that some planning permissions that were granted relatively recently may 
relate to an application first submitted several years before.   
 
Reasons for stalled schemes 
 
5.34 Reasons put forward (by the developer/landowner and/or local planning authority  
for sites becoming stalled varied between schemes and there were only a limited 
number of patterns that emerged to explain and categorise sites.  The exception to 
this  is  the  importance  placed  on  ‘changed  market  conditions’  as  a  reason  for  sites  
becoming stalled.  However, it is not the only reason and there is usually a 
combination of factors determining whether a site is stalled or progressing.  Table 
5.6 sets out the main reasons put forward for delays. (Note that there could be more 
than one reason for each case study).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
22 One case study was a series of small schemes with variable planning histories. This case study is not 
included in the table 
23 In all these cases, there was a resolution to grant permission but the section 106 agreement was still being 
negotiated. 
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Table 5.6: Reasons for Case Study Schemes Becoming Stalled 
 
Reasons mentioned (one or more reasons could be mentioned 
for each case study) 
No of 
mentions 
Market conditions: 
Market values have fallen/sales rates generally down 
Development finance difficult to secure 
Low sales rates/ market change means that need a different mix 
of dwellings (e.g. replace apartments with houses) 
 
10 
1 
3 
General viability issues 
Generally a difficult scheme to make work (e.g. high abnormal 
costs/low values) 
‘Over-paid’  for  the  site 
 
4 
 
2 
Ownership issues  
Change of owners (and could lead to a completely new scheme) 
Third parties with control over part of site/ consortium of 
developers and/or landowners failing to agree/ change in 
personal circumstances of landowner 
 
2 
3 
Developer not actively pursuing development 
Waiting for upturn in market, have a better scheme nearby 
Sought policy compliant permission but anticipated would not be 
viable 
 
6 
2 
Other issues 
Third party actions e.g. unforeseen intervention by a utility 
 
1 
Complex scheme with long lead in times (usually, but not 
exclusively, large scale schemes) 
4 
 
5.35 Changing market conditions underlie most schemes that become stalled. Market 
values  have  fallen  (‘house  prices  have  dropped  through  the  floor’)  and  price  
reductions of circa 15% were quoted by developers.  But rates of sales have also 
fallen, for example one interviewee indicated that current sale rates were about 
50% of predicted rates pre- downturn. 
 
5.36 Clearly deterioration in market conditions can reduce viability.  One developer of a 
larger  greenfield  site  pointed  out  that  “…the  agreement  was  fair  and  policy  
compliant  but  it  was  assessed  in  a  rising  housing  market….”    When  the  
developer/landowner is faced with the changed market circumstances they have to 
decide whether to proceed or wait until market conditions improve. Their decision 
can be affected by other house-building in the area and/or if the same developer is 
trying to promote two or more schemes in a slow market.  
 
5.37 Putting aside the general issues of time taken to progress large-scale 
developments, the other reason that leads to some sites stalling is around land 
ownership.  This can involve a third party with control over a vital piece of land 
and/or issues to be resolved within a developer and/or landowner consortium.   
 
5.38 The scale of section 106 requirements associated with a development were not 
specifically highlighted as a reason for sites becoming stalled but when the process 
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of renegotiation is considered later in this chapter, it is section 106 requirements 
(and especially affordable housing) that becomes more of the focus. 
 
Scale and Nature of Planning Obligations 
 
5.39 Across the case studies a diverse range of planning obligations had been agreed. 
For affordable housing, only one scheme above the local site size threshold had an 
agreed 0% affordable housing provision and this was on viability grounds. Where 
affordable housing was sought the amount varied, although perhaps not as much 
as might have been expected given the range of market values and development 
conditions found in the case studies. 
 
5.40 Sample sizes are too small to draw robust conclusions but, whereas in the high and 
medium  value  areas  a  requirement  for  20%  to  30%  was  the  ‘norm’,  in  the  low  value  
areas 20 to 25% was more typical. 
 
5.41 Other obligations agreed were scheme-specific and depended on measures 
required to mitigate the impact of the development including, for example, 
highways, education, renewable energy and play areas. 
 
5.42 As well as variety in the make-up of the contributions required, the case studies 
varied in the amount of contribution per dwelling, as the following examples 
illustrate: 
 
• Small scheme/high value area    £3,700 per dwelling 
(no affordable housing – below threshold) 
 
• Large scheme/medium value area   £13,000  + 30% 
affordable housing  
 
• Large scheme/high value area    £2,800 + 35% using 
 
• Small scheme/low value area    £3,000 + 25% 
affordable housing 
 
• Large scheme/low value area    £1,800 + 0% 
affordable housing 
 
 
The Renegotiation Process 
 
5.43 The case studies support the view that local planning authorities will usually 
renegotiate a scheme if viability is raised as an issue. There is little commonality in 
the way (re)negotiations take place.  The survey did not find evidence of any 
systematic pattern of inflexible local authorities that were unprepared or unwilling to 
renegotiate.  Where developers complained about the (re)negotiation process, the 
cause for this is usually that evidence presented on scheme viability is not 
perceived to be given sufficient weight by the local planning authority.   
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5.44 Inexperience of the negotiation process by developer or local planning officers were 
cited as a reason for a slow and difficult negotiation.  This is compounded where the 
planning (or highway) authority’s  requirements  change  midway  through  the  process  
and further exacerbated if there is a landowner with unrealistic and inflexible 
expectations. 
 
5.45 Mostly renegotiations focused around the amount of affordable housing but this was 
not always the case.  In a couple of examples, the developer indicated that 
affordable  housing  was  a  helpful  element  of  the  scheme,  providing  ‘risk  free’  
revenue at a difficult time.  However, the type of affordable housing can result in 
some debate since differences in tenure (social rented, affordable rent, affordable 
home ownership) affect development viability.   
 
5.46 Negotiating affordable housing invariably means that the local authority housing 
departments become involved and there is a three-way relationship between the 
applicant, planning and housing officers.  This can cause tensions where the 
housing officer is attempting to secure housing to meet an identified need and the 
planning officer is looking across the development as a whole.   
 
5.47 Other planning requirements cause issues in negotiations.  For example, where an 
authority uses a formula to calculate payments for a particular item (e.g. highway or 
education contribution) and this leads to inflexibility in the negotiation process. 
 
5.48 For very large schemes, major infrastructure requirements necessary early in the 
development were identified as having an adverse impact on scheme viability and 
re-timing their provision was seen to be necessary to bring the scheme forward.  
This, though, could cause the local planning authority considerable difficulty if the 
item  was  seen  as  an  ‘early  win’  from  the  scale  of  development  permitted.     
 
5.49 We found examples of negotiations that had gone smoothly and resolved a series 
of outstanding issues: 
‘The  renegotiated  agreement was approached realistically by the local authority.  
They showed willingness to renegotiate, were cooperative, sensible and not 
obstructive.’ 
 ‘The  local  authority  wants  to  get  delivery  and  is  prepared  to  negotiate.’ 
 
Dealing with Viability Issues 
 
5.50 Assessing scheme viability has been shown to be integral to the negotiation and 
renegotiation of section 106 agreements.  The way this is approached from both 
developers and local authority officers was mixed and we found few examples of 
published protocols to explain how each local planning authority deals with viability 
issues. 
 
5.51 Below is a list of the different ways in which evidence about viability was dealt with: 
 
• Local planning authority  relies on a generic study of viability (e.g. in support 
of the Local Plan or  community infrastructure levy charging  schedule); 
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• Local planning authority undertakes its own viability assessment of stalled 
sites in its area to assess viability issues; 
 
• Local planning authority employs an expert to negotiate with the developer 
and/or  employs  the  District  Valuer  as  an  ‘impartial  advisor’;; 
 
• Developer submits a viability study to the local planning authority  which 
reviews its contents (this can be followed by a series of 
questions/responses), following which the local planning authority may or 
may not be persuaded by the viability study; 
 
• Developer required to submit a completed model with information about the 
scheme (e.g. the Homes and Communities Agency Economic Appraisal 
Toolkit). 
 
5.52 Whichever approach was taken, there can still be lengthy disputes about 
assumptions used in a viability appraisal (whether undertaken by the local planning 
authority or developer).  Even the involvement of a third party such as the District 
Valuer does not necessarily lead to an agreed position on viability.  Viability 
assessments are normally commercially sensitive and this can add to difficulties in 
resolving issues and the matter of transparency for the local planning authority  
about the reasons for accepting a reduced planning requirement on one scheme 
rather than another. 
 
Potential implications of the case studies 
 
5.53 The case studies have identified a need for greater consistency and transparency in 
approaches to negotiation, both in terms of the negotiation process itself and in the 
evidence that is required to take negotiations forward when scheme viability is an 
issue. Possible approaches to this are already available, e.g. through the use of 
Planning Performance Agreements as well as other advice and guidance produced 
by a range of organisations. Nevertheless, the importance of the way in which 
negotiations are undertaken (and tailored to individual schemes) has been 
highlighted as a key issue in research, such that the Department for Communities 
and Local Government could consider exploring this further as well as the potential 
for fresh approaches to enhance negotiating skills and practice.   
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6. Community Infrastructure Levy and 
Section 106 Agreements 
Introduction 
 
6.1 The Community Infrastructure Levy is a new planning charge that came into force 
on 6 April 2010. The levy allows local authorities in England and Wales to choose to 
raise contributions from developers to fund infrastructure that is needed as a result 
of new development. It applies to most new buildings and charges are based on the 
size and type of the new development. Community Infrastructure Levy rates for their 
areas are to be expressed as pounds (£) per square metre (sq m).  
 
6.2 It was never the intention to undertake a full review of the operation of the 
Community Infrastructure Levy as part of this study; the arrangements are simply 
too new and there is too little practical experience for a robust investigation.  
Nevertheless, this study provides an opportunity to highlight any early trends in 
practice and to flag any major issues that may be arising.  The study brief therefore 
included a limited review of the operation of the Community Infrastructure Levy and 
had two research objectives; to consider the likely impact of the levy on section 106 
benefits, and the future relationship between the levy and section 106.   
 
Key findings 
 
• The majority of local planning authorities are in the process of introducing the 
Community Infrastructure Levy but there is a small minority (around a 
quarter) that are yet to decide whether they will take up this option. 
 
• Section 106 contributions will still be collected but the degree to which they 
are likely to be scaled back varies between authorities.  
 
• The level of specification of infrastructure items to be paid for by the 
Community Infrastructure Levy varies greatly between local planning 
authorities and infrastructure type - for example, one infrastructure list may 
include  “school  places”  and  another,  a  list  of  schools  by  name. 
 
• While section 106 agreements are still necessary to deliver affordable 
housing, the introduction of the Community Infrastructure Levy will likely lead 
to a reduction in the number of schemes requiring section 106 agreements 
for other (site specific) measures. But at the same time, there is the potential 
for achieving higher incomes for funding infrastructure than from section 106 
alone in the pre-levy world.   
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Research approach 
 
6.3 This strand of the research is based on a combination of published information from 
local authorities which are either implementing the Community Infrastructure Levy 
or are in the process of adopting it, and short interviews/questionnaire with five local 
authorities which have implemented the levy during 2012. 
 
6.4 The local authority questionnaire survey (see Chapter 2) showed that, as at 31 
March 2012, the majority of local authorities either had a Community Iinfrastructure 
Levy already adopted, or were in different stages of its preparation.  Only 28% of 
local planning authorities either said they were not preparing a charging schedule or 
did not say what they were doing about the levy. 
 
6.5 In order to review how the Community Infrastructure Levy is likely to impact on 
planning obligations we examined published information for 23 local authorities that 
could  be  described  as  being  ‘the  most  advanced’  in  adopting the levy. They 
included the charging authorities that have either implemented or adopted the levy 
or are at Examination/ published Draft Charging schedule stages (as at October 
31st 2012).  The information collected was taken from their websites and includes:   
 
• stage  in  the  ‘Community Infrastructure Levy process’  (implemented,  adopted,  
pre/post examination, draft charging schedule);  
 
• levy rates by use;  
 
• date of viability assessment; 
 
• assumptions regarding section 106 used in viability assessment;  
 
• any evidence regarding historic levels of section 106 contributions;  
 
• the list of stated infrastructure to be paid for by the levy, as set out in a 
Regulation 123 schedule (where available). 
 
6.6 Five local authorities with an adopted charging schedule were contacted to obtain 
information via a telephone interview or by completing a short questionnaire with 
the following questions:   
 
• What motivated the local authority to proceed with the levy and how far was 
this decision driven by the changes to section 106 pooled contributions from 
2014?  
 
• How is the system operating and where is the line drawn between the levy 
and section 106? 
 
• Are there early indications that the amount collected from the levy and 
section 106 from developments is different from that collected under the 
previous section 106 regime? 
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• How many section 106 agreements have been signed since the local 
planning authority started charging in 2011/2012 and what were they for? 
How does this compare with the pre-levy world?  
 
• What happens when viability concerns are raised and to what extent does 
the negotiation become a discussion about affordable housing?  
 
Analysis of Local Authority views on scaled back section 
106 
6.7 Where a local authority decides to introduce the Community Insfrastructure Levy, 
and in order to ensure that developments are not charged twice for the same items, 
it publishes a list of infrastructure projects or types of infrastructure that it intends to 
be wholly or partly funded by the levy.   Infrastructure schemes are defined in 
section 216 of the Planning Act  2008 as including: 
 
a) roads and other transport facilities 
b) flood defences 
c) schools and other educational facilities 
d) medical facilities 
e) sporting and recreational facilities 
f) open spaces 
 
6.8 We reviewed Regulation 123 lists of nine local authorities which had either adopted 
the levy or were in final draft stage to assess the range and type of infrastructure 
being funded by the levy. From our initial sample of 23 authorities, these were the 
authorities which, from the web search, had a Regulation 123  list that we could 
easily analyse. The key points to emerge were: 
 
• Transport schemes (mainly identified as specific projects) were included by 
all nine authorities. Whilst highway schemes accounted for the majority (new 
roads, improvements/upgrading, intersections, etc.) other forms of transport 
were listed such as cycle/pedestrian routes, public transport, rail 
connections, etc. Some of the earlier charging authorities listed 20+ schemes 
but later ones had much shorter lists of projects. 
 
• All authorities listed education as a key beneficiary of funding, mainly of a 
generic nature rather than specific establishments. 
 
• About two thirds of the authorities had projects or types of infrastructure 
under  the  headings  of  ‘open  space’,  ‘sport  and  recreation’  and  ‘flood  
schemes’  in  a  mixture  of  generic  and  specific  schemes. 
 
• About  a  third  or  less  had  listed  schemes  under  ‘community facilities’,  ‘health’  
and  ‘public  realm’. 
 
• Two  London  boroughs’  lists  were  generic  in  nature  rather  than  lists  of  
specific projects. 
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6.9 These key points highlight the strategic nature of the infrastructure provision to be 
funded as intended, with a mixture of generic and specific projects in the lists. 
 
Table 6.1:  Types of Infrastructure in Regulation 123 Lists 
 
Types of Infrastructure (Regulation 123 
list) 
No. of LOCAL 
PLANNING 
AUTHORITIESs (9)24 
Transport 9 
Education 9 
Open Space 6 
Sport /Recreation 5 
Other (Mainly flood defences) 5 
Health 4 
Community facilities 3 
Public Realm 2 
 
 
6.10 In order to investigate how section 106 benefits were likely to be treated under the 
Community Infrastructure Levy regime, we examined 23 viability assessments 
which had been prepared and published as evidence for the levy charge and which 
were/are to be subject to examination. We focused on the part of the assessment 
where viability was modelled for residential schemes across an area and on what 
assumptions regarding the scale of section 106 benefits were used in the model 
(excluding affordable housing).   
 
6.11 The initial viability assessments for nine local authorities which had either adopted 
or approved the levy before 31st October 2012 showed that over half (five) had 
assumed a low amount for section 106 i.e. £500 - £1,000 per dwelling. The rest had 
used assumptions of £3,000 and £5,000 per unit. Two authorities had also assumed 
a figure of £15,000 per unit for large strategic sites (but £1,000 or £5,000 for other 
sites in their area). 
 
6.12 For 14 authorities, where preparation of the levy was still in progress, their viability 
evidence was based on a range of assumptions about the likely level of section 106 
to be charged (rather than a flat rate). For three authorities it appears that no 
residual section 106 payments were assumed.  The remaining authorities were in 
the following groups: 
 
• Six used flat rates of a relatively low amount i.e. £500 - £1,000 per unit – 
these authorities might also have a much higher figure for their large 
strategic sites (and up to as much as £23,000 per dwelling); 
 
                                            
 
24 Authorities which had either adopted the levy or were in final draft stage winter 2012 
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• Two authorities used a range depending on development type, e.g. £1,000 to 
£4,000 per dwelling, distinguishing small brownfield sites and larger 
greenfield sites to test viability; 
 
• The remaining two used a flat rate figure of around £8,000 to £10,000 per 
dwelling. 
 
6.13 Overall, but with exceptions for much larger sites requiring extensive site related 
infrastructure, assumptions tended to be at the lower end for residual seciton 106 
site related benefits. It is an important early (and we must acknowledge provisional) 
conclusion that local authorities do not generally see the Community Infrastructure 
Levy as a mechanism for funding the infrastructure needed for large-scale 
development. The infrastructure may be of such a scale as can legitimately be 
described  as  ‘strategic’  but  if  it  serves  a  single  development  (however  large)  
authorities are tending to treat this as a site specific requirement and look to a 
section 106 agreement for its provision.  On the other hand, smaller items of 
infrastructure that serve a number of sites will be seen as suitable for funding from 
levy receipts (and inclusion in Regulation 123 lists). 
 
Case study evidence of Local Authorities with Community 
infrastructure levy in operation   
 
6.14 Five local authorities were asked a short list of questions about their operation of 
the levy and its impact on section 106. The key points under each question  are as 
follows: 
 
6.15 Q1 What motivated the local authority to proceed with the levy and how far was the 
decision  driven by the changes to section 106 pooled contributions from 2014?  
 
• The  change  (post  April  2014)  in  limiting  the  ‘pooling’  of  section 106 
contributions was a key motivator for introducing the levy for some, but not 
all, of the authorities. Other factors included, the capture of small 
contributions from a much wider range of developments (often where it had 
not been realistic to negotiate planning contributions previously), the 
reduction of previously available funding pots, and the ability in these early 
stages of the Community Infrastructure Levy to demonstrate that funding 
would be in place to support growth alongside a new local plan.  The levy 
was seen to be capable of speeding up the process for securing payments 
from sites (especially smaller schemes) where previously there would need 
to be a negotiation to arrive at a section 106 agreement.  Again, this 
advantage focused on the process for smaller schemes. 
 
6.16 Q2 How is the system operating and where is the line drawn between the levy and 
section 106?  
 
• How the line is drawn between strategic infrastructure to support growth and 
site specific/local infrastructure is a matter of judgement (but recognising that 
the authority must not seek section 106 contributions for something that is 
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levy-funded).  Two authorities also prepared “Developer Contributions”  
Supplementary Planning Documents alongside  Community Infrastructure 
Levy preparation to provide clarity and to identify those obligations still 
required for large strategic sites. An interesting comment was that in 
reviewing its Regulation 123 list, one authority said that it was likely to 
refocus the list on their top priorities. 
 
• Authorities operating the levy are very aware of the importance of the way 
their Regulation 123 list is drawn up and that items excluded from the list are 
capable of being delivered by section 106 agreements for schemes. 
 
6.17 Q3 Are there early indications that the amount collected from the levy and section 
106 from developments is different than from under the previous section 106 
regime? 
 
• Where authorities report an uplift of income since implementing the levy, it is 
not because they are collecting more from each scheme but because the 
levy applies to (nearly) all development. Getting income from smaller sites 
was cited as being a fairer system than before as these sites would not 
previously have attracted a section 106 contribution; 
 
• But not all the local planning authorities in the (very small) sample reported 
an immediate sign of an uplift in money collected - two authorities stated that 
it was difficult to say due to low amounts actually paid to date (although a 
significant number of liability notices have been issued) and large sites were 
being treated the same as pre-levy with regard to obligations required.  
 
• Low actual income to date outside of London/south east was attributed to the 
wider financial climate. 
 
6.18 Q4a How many section 106 agreements have been signed since the local authority 
started charging in 2012 and what were they for? 
 
Q4b How does this compare with the pre-levy world? 
 
• The number of section 106s negotiated and signed has reduced for the 
sample of authorities since  the levy was introduced; in some cases, the fall 
has been dramatic.  It is difficult to say whether this is due to the introduction 
of the levy and a period of transition for the authority, or due to a slowing 
down of development due to the wider financial climate. A couple of 
authorities, for example, had signed around ten section 106 agreements in 
the past year compared with more than 50 per annum in pre-levy days.  
These first signs of the impact of the levy suggest a potential scaling back of 
seciton 106 negotiations and could be the start of a longer term trend.  This 
is an aspect that the Department for Communities and Local Government 
can keep under review as the levy is more widely implemented – it could, for 
example, be readily picked up in a future study of the type undertaken in 
2011/12.  
 
 79 
• Affordable housing was the majority component of section 106s that were 
used, which is not unexpected as it is excluded from levy funding.  
 
6.19 Q5 What happens when viability concerns are raised and to what extent does the 
negotiation become a discussion about affordable housing?  
 
• When questions of viability are raised, the key issue is almost always 
affordable housing and this is also the element with most flexibility in any 
agreement.  However, one authority said that other contributions such as 
education, open space, etc. could be affected as well. 
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7. Conclusions 
7.1 A drop in the level of activity since 2007/8 was a recurring theme across the study 
and it is no surprise that the number of planning agreements per local authority had 
fallen by a third between 2007/8 and 2011/12.  
 
7.2 As shown in Figure 7.1, the total value of planning obligations agreed during the 
financial year 2011/12 was estimated at £3.7bn. This compares to £1.9 billion in 
2003/4, £4 billion in 2005/6 and £4.9 billion in 2007/8. The difficult market conditions 
post-2008 and the consequent fall in development activity almost certainly explain 
the reduction in obligations between 2007/08 and 2011/12. 
 
Figure 7.1: Total value of planning obligations in £ billion – 2003/04 to 
2011/12 
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7.3 As in previous studies, affordable housing is the single largest component of the 
value of agreed planning obligations – with an estimated contribution of £2.3bn 
(62% of the total). The number of affordable dwellings generated by planning 
agreement in 2011/12 is between 31,000 and 33,000.  This compares to over 
48,000 in 2007/08, a 33% reduction.  A significant element of provision in 2011/12 
was concentrated in London (52% of all units agreed) which is significantly higher 
than in 2007/08 (at just under 30%). The shift towards affordable housing delivery in 
London may be a short term effect but it will be important to identify and understand 
any longer term trends.  
 
7.4 The make-up  of the remaining planning contributions in 2011/12 shows the relative 
importance of direct payments as opposed to in-kind and land contributions: 
 
• Just over £1 billion of direct payments were agreed with education and 
transport accounting for nearly 60% of this total.   
• Land contributions were about £307 million with over 70% of these being for 
open space and affordable housing 
• The value of in-kind contributions was at least £80 million .  
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7.5 The second part of the research addressed the issue of stalled schemes and the 
effect that scheme viability has on the delivery of development.  Modelling of 
hypothetical development sites suggests that, far from a simple picture of worsening 
viability since 2007/08, the interaction of changes in both costs and values means 
that changes in viability have varied between locations and development types.  
High value locations such as London have bounced back better from the fall in 
market values between 2007/08 and 2011/12 and are more able to absorb recent 
increases in build costs.  There is therefore less reason for sites becoming or 
remaining stalled in these locations. However, medium and low value areas, where 
house prices are still below 2007/08 levels and build costs have recently started to 
rise again, are likely to have experienced continued problems with stalled sites. 
 
7.6 These themes were borne out by the Glenigan national database of stalled sites.  
This showed a concentration of stalled sites in low land value areas.  But the 
Glenigan data also showed that approximately two thirds of stalled residential units 
were in apartment-led developments, a substantial majority of which were 
brownfield.     
 
7.7 At the other end of the development spectrum, the call for case studies of stalled 
sites produced a disproportionate number of large-scale greenfield urban 
extensions in medium and low value areas, accounting for 15% of all sites but 71% 
of all dwellings.  
 
7.8 The in-depth analysis of the case studies strongly supports the view that changing 
market conditions are the major determinant of development schemes becoming 
stalled and that  schemes in medium and lower value areas (again particularly 
higher density schemes on brownfield sites and large-scale greenfield sites) have 
been more affected by deteriorating viability.  Beyond this central finding, the case 
study analysis showed multiple causes for sites becoming stalled including strategic 
behaviour by developers and house builders, and disagreements or temporary 
problems with development partners or site owners.  While the impact of section 
106 agreements on viability did play a role in some case studies, this was not a 
universal feature explaining site delivery difficulties.   
 
7.9 Both the local planning authority survey and the case studies indicate that local 
authorities and developers are generally flexible in re-negotiating planning 
agreements. But the case studies highlighted that practice in the way renegotiations 
are undertaken varies considerably.  Where the debate between local planning 
authority and applicant turned on viability issues, there is no single approach to the 
use  of  evidence  to  ‘prove’  a  case.    There  is  an  apparent  need  for  greater  
consistency and transparency in approaches to negotiation – in the evidence that is 
required to take negotiations forward and in the planning mechanisms that can be 
used to improve viability.  While much has already been done to provide advice and 
guidance around these issues, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government could consider this further and explore the potential for fresh 
approaches to enhance negotiating skills and practice.   
 
7.10 Finally, the research focussed on the use of section 106 agreements and the 
implementation of the Community Infrastructure Levy – recognising that, at the time 
of the research, implementation of the levy was still very new.  Early indications are 
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that the levy will run alongside significantly scaled back section 106 payments but 
local planning authorities  are taking different views on the level of section 106 
payments relevant to their area and the rate of  Community Infrastructure Levy to 
be sought.  With the introduction of the levy, local planning authorities can be in a 
position to increase the funding available for new infrastructure to support 
development in their area (because they collect funds from a wider range of 
development than hitherto), while reducing the number of section 106 agreements 
that are needed. 
 
7.11 Given the subdued macro-economic and development market context that form the 
backdrop to this study, a number of specific issues emerge, which may be worthy of 
further investigation:  
 
• Firstly, there may be a widening disparity between agreed and delivered 
planning obligations, particularly outside London 
 
• Secondly, the relatively low levels of affordable housing supply provided 
through this mechanism in areas with weak to medium value housing 
markets, has wider policy implications that merit further investigation.  
 
• Thirdly, the study has provided some very early indications of the way the 
Community Infrastructure Levy and section 106 contributions are interacting, 
reflecting the intentions that lie behind the levy. The Department for 
Communities and Local Government will no doubt want to revisit this when 
the levy is more firmly established.  Any future update of this study should 
incorporate, as a central element of the work, a focused review of the way 
the levy is evolving and its impact on the scale and type of planning 
obligations collected. 
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Below is a list of the local authorities that replied to the questionnaire survey. 
 
Allerdale Borough Council London Thames Gateway 
Ashford Borough Council Mansfield District Council 
Barnsley MBC Medway Council 
Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council Mendip District Council 
Bath and North East Somerset Council Middlesbrough Council 
Bedford Borough Council Mid-Sussex Council 
Birmingham City Council Newark and Sherwood District Council 
Blaby District Council Norfolk County Council 
Blackburn With Darwen Borough Council North Somerset Council 
Bolton Council North Dorset District Council 
Borough Council of King's Lynn and West Norfolk North Lincolnshire Council 
Borough of Broxbourne North Tyneside Council 
Bournemouth Borough Council North Warwickshire BC 
Bracknell Forest Borough Council North York Moors NPA 
Brighton and Hove City Council Norwich City Council 
Broadland District Council Nottinghamshire County Council 
Burnley Borough Council Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council 
Bury Council Oxford City Council 
Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council Peterborough City Council 
Cambridgeshire County Council Purbeck District Council 
Carlisle City Council Richmond District Council 
Castle Point Borough Council Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames  
Chelmsford City Council Rugby Borough Council 
Cheshire East Borough Council Runnymede Borough Council 
Chesterfield Borough Council Salford City Council 
Chichester District Council Sandwell MBC 
Chiltern District Council Scarborough Borough Council 
City of London Corporation Sefton MBC 
Cotswold District Council Shropshire Council 
Crawley Borough Council Somerset County Council 
Daventry District Council South Gloucestershire Council 
Dorset County Council South Oxfordshire District Council 
Dudley Council South Staffordshire Council 
East Cambridgeshire District Council South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 
East Lindsey District Council Southend Borough Council 
East Northants Council St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council 
East Riding of Yorkshire Council Stafford borough Council 
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East Staffordshire Borough Council  Stockton on Tees Borough Council 
East Sussex County Council Suffolk Coastal District Council 
Eastbourne Borough Council Surrey Heath Borough Council 
Eden District Council Tameside MBC 
Elmbridge Borough Council Tamworth Borough Council 
Exeter City Council Tandridge District Council 
Fareham Borough Council Teignbridge District Council 
Forest of Dean District Council Three Rivers District Council 
Gosport Borough Council Thurrock Council 
Guildford Borough Council Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council 
Hampshire County Council Trafford District Council 
Harborough District Council Tunbridge Wells Borough Council 
Harlow District Council Uttlesford District Council 
Hartlepool Walsall Council 
Hinckley & Bosworth Borough Council Wandsworth Council 
Hull City Council Watford Council 
Isle of Wight Council Waveney 
Ipswich Borough Council Waverley Borough Council 
London Borough of Islington  Wealden District Council 
Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council 
Lake District West Dorset District Council 
Lancaster City Council West Lancashire Borough Council  
Leeds City Council West Lindsey District Council  
Lewes District Council West Northamptonshire District Council 
Lichfield District Council West Somerset District Council 
London Borough of Bexley Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council 
London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham Wirral Council 
London Borough of Havering Wokingham Borough Council 
London Borough of Lewisham Worcester City Council 
London Borough of Redbridge Wycombe District Council 
London Borough of Southwark  
London Borough of Sutton  
London Borough of Tower Hamlets  
 
 
 
 
